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As the cigar smoke in the boardrooms clears, 
the comfortably reclining figures are instantly 
revealed as being of two types: the executive 
directors who run the business and take the 
rap, and the non-executive directors who, 
having read their papers carefully for the pre-
lunch board meeting, asked their statutory 
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question, and enjoyed a reasonable rib of beef, 
are ready to depart blamelessly to their bank, 
chambers, farm or villa for another two 
months.1 
 
[The aim] is actually to draw attention [to] 
developing it as an independent decision 
maker.2  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Anglo-American corporate governance has long 
remained fixated on ensuring that the interests of dispersed 
shareholders in publicly listed corporations prevail over 
competing managerial interests.3 The main solution offered 
here has been to conceptualize directors as the stockholders’ 
agents for monitoring managers.4 But the rise of large 
institutional stockholders in global markets, especially in the 
United States,5 has cast doubt on this theory’s empirical 
                                                
	  
	  
1 See Philip L.R. Mitchell, Non-Executive Directors, 6 BUS. L. REV. 173, 173-
174, (1985), cited in JEAN JACQUES DU PLESSIS ET. AL, PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 101 (3d ed. 2014). 
2 Charles Groome of Hong Kong Venture capital fund, Deep Knowledge 
Venture, on the appointment of VITAL – an algorithm – to the firm’s 
board of directors: Rob Wile, A Venture Capital Firm Just Named an 
Algorithm to its Board of Directors: Here's What it Actually Does, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (May 14, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/vital-
named-to-board-2014-5 (emphasis added). 
3 See, e.g., ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
4 See generally REINER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW 35, 307-9 (2d ed. 2009). 
5 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 
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premise. Influential commentators now urge measures 
encouraging stockholders to take more active roles in 
corporate governance,6 or press more broadly for enhancing 
their rights in light of expansive directorial discretion.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 875 (2013) (by 2009 the largest 1,000 U.S. 
corporations had an average institutional holding of 73 percent); Ronald 
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency capitalism: further implications of 
equity intermediation, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 32 
(Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015); Ronald J. Gilson & 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of Equity 
Intermediation, 239/2014 EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE 
(ECGI) – LAW WORKING PAPER (2014); 456 STANFORD LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OLIN WORKING PAPER (2014); 461 COLUMBIA LAW AND 
ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER (2014). In this connection, activist funds 
serve as useful catalysts for corporate change. With over $120 billion 
under management, the consequences are meaningful, particularly in the 
United States where eighty per cent of activist interventions occur. An 
Investor Calls, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21642175-sometimes-ill-
mannered-speculative-and-wrong-activists-are-rampant-they-will-
change-american. Elsewhere, The Economist reports that since 2009, fifty 
per cent of S & P 500 companies have had a “big activist fund” on their 
share register, with one in seven of these companies being subjected to 
an “activist attack.” Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 
2015), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21642169-why-
activist-investors-are-good-public-company-capitalisms-unlikely-heroes. 
6 See Paul Edelman, Randall Thomas, & Robert Thompson, Shareholder 
Voting in the Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359 (2014); 
cf. Chief Justice Leo Strine, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A 
Pragmatic Reaction, to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014) cited in Robert B. Thompson, Whether 
Directors Must Maximize Shareholder Wealth-and the American Connection to 
the Increased Role of Activist Shareholders, (paper presented at Supreme 
Court of New South Wales Annual Corporate Law Conference, Sydney, 
Australia, Sept. 8, 2015) (on file with the authors).  
7 See generally Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 
18 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
2016 THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN AUSTRALIA 575 
 
Others insist, albeit through the lens of stockholder wealth 
maximization and while allowing for significant differences 
among countries, that the board should retain significant 
decision-making powers.8 
In this ongoing debate, the issue of board composition 
has largely escaped sustained academic attention.9 The 
conventional wisdom advocates that the board should be 
predominantly non-executive and “independent,” especially 
when exercising key functions where conflicts of interest 
may surface (such as conducting audits or nominations and 
approving remuneration). However, a closer comparative 
analysis of leading jurisdictions reveals that the meaning of 
independence remains far from settled.10 For instance, the 
U.S. has gradually expanded independent director 
requirements, but retains a comparatively unusual definition 
of an “independent” director, by including within the 
definition a significant stockholder or its nominee.11 By 
contrast, the Australian corporate governance framework 
                                                
	  
	  
8 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Preserving Director Primacy by Managing 
Shareholder Interventions, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 
231 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas ed. 2015); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New Zealand Company 
Law as Compared to U.S.A. Corporate Law, 14-05 UCLA L.-ECON. RES. 
PAPER (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2416449. 
9 Cf. Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 
U. OF PA. L. REV. 1907 (2013); 13-19 U. PENN., INST. FOR L. & ECON. RES. 
PAPER 1922-23, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2279147 (arguing that the new 
landscape of institutional investors has resolved the problem of 
“captured directors”). 
10 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 73 (2007). 
11 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the 
United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
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has instead encouraged − and partly mandated − that boards 
include “independent” directors who are separated from 
significant stockholders. In this respect, as explained in this 
article, Australia has been a regulatory exporter: that is, the 
stricter conception of director independence has influenced 
other Asian-Pacific legal systems, especially those that share 
the English common law tradition, such as Hong Kong.12  
The backdrop to the Australian approach is a 
“blockholder” tradition, involving family or other large 
companies.13 While there is now a large and active market 
for stocks listed on the Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX),14 in the 1990s, stockholdings were significantly more 
concentrated and institutional investors less active than their 
                                                
	  
	  
12 See Rules & Recommendations on the Number of Independent Directors in 
Asia, ASIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSOCIATION (July 2010). 
13 See Geof Stapledon, Share Ownership and Corporate Control in Listed 
Australian Companies, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 17 (1999); 
Asjeet Lamba & Geof Stapledon, The Determination of Corporate Ownership 
Structure: Australian Evidence, 20 U. OF MEL. PUBL. L. RES. PAPER (2001), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=279015; Richard 
Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell, Ian Ramsay, & Michelle Welsh, Shareholder 
Protection in Australia: Institutional Configurations and Regulatory Evolution, 
38 MELB. U. L. REV. 68 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2489807; Alan 
Dignam & Michael Galanis, Australia Inside-Out: The Corporate Governance 
System of the Australian Listed Market, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 623 (2004). 
14 For statistics comparing other stock exchanges in the Asian 
region, see Luke Nottage, Corporate Governance in Australia: The 
Evolving Blockholder Legacy, 08/28 SYDNEY L. SCH. RES. PAPER 
(2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105639; 
see also Luke Nottage, Paper for the conference on “Independent 
Directors in Japan and other Major 
Jurisdictions in Asia,” Japanese German Center Berlin, July 17-19, 2014, 
http://tinyurl.com/lwtrwkl. 
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U.S. and especially U.K. counterparts. In this environment, 
another complicating corporate governance concern comes 
to the forefront: overbearing conduct by controlling 
shareholders vis-à-vis smaller shareholders.15 
Notwithstanding vocal criticisms discussed below, real 
concerns that a relaxation of the substantial shareholding 
criterion might disproportionately benefit large over smaller 
stockholders militated against its removal. In this 
connection, the Australian regulatory response, in part, has 
been to maintain a strict conception of independence.  
There are many other factors in Australia’s corporate 
governance framework that have arguably impacted the 
relevance of independent directors, and in particular, the 
perceived disciplinary function they perform. First, non-
institutional blockholders have alternative means of 
monitoring risk and performance, such as by nominating 
and supporting executive directors. Second, hostile 
takeovers are still a prominent feature of Australia’s 
corporate governance landscape and they enjoy quite high 
success rates thanks to the adoption of several substantive 
principles from the U.K., despite the latter’s different 
underlying shareholding patterns. Third, the cumulative 
effect of bipartisan legislative amendments since the early 
1990s − aimed primarily at empowering shareholders 
(especially vis-à-vis executives) and partly as a response to 
major corporate failures in the late 1980s and around 2001 − 
has further enhanced board accountability.16 Fourth, the 
                                                
	  
	  
15 See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 35, 190-2, 195-6, 202-7, 256-
65, 309-11. 
16 Helen L. Anderson, Michelle Welsh, Ian Ramsay, & Peter Gahan, The 
Evolution of Shareholder and Creditor Protection in Australia: An International 
Comparison, 61 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 171 (2012). 
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Australian Securities and Investment Commission’s (ASIC) 
more vigorous law enforcement strategy over the last 
decade, especially since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), has also caused regulatory ripples in Australia’s 
corporate governance framework.17 (Of course, there have 
also been bombastic regulatory failures.)18 In this fluid 
situation, blockholder influence over policy-makers or 
regulators may therefore be waning. Alternatively, 
blockholders may now view such changes as beneficial (or at 
the very least having little effect on large shareholders and 
dispersed shareholders), particularly as they relate to 
executive managers.  
Part II of this Chapter explains the longstanding 
tension between those preferring a narrower view of 
directors’ roles and duties (focused on corporate 
performance) and those advocating a broader view (with a 
greater emphasis on risk management, which may favor 
smaller shareholders with less information about their firm’s 
                                                
	  
	  
17 Jennifer Hill, Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative 
Corporate Governance, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70. 
GEBURTSTAG AM 24. AUGUST 2010 795-815 (S. Grundmann et al. eds., 
Walter de Gruyter 2014). The shift is generally consistent with a move 
from a “Coasian” (self-regulatory) model, via a “Public enabling” model, 
to a “Public enforcement” model. See generally A. Dignam, Lamenting 
Reform? The Changing Nature of Common Law Corporate Governance 
Regulation, 25 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 283 (2007). 
18 See, e.g., SENATE ECONOMICS REFERENCES COMMITTEE, PARLIAMENT OF 
AUSTRALIA, PERFORMANCE OF THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND 
INVESTMENTS COMMISSION: FINAL REPORT (2014) (highly critical of ASIC’s 
ineffective regulation of financial planners); Adele Ferguson, Ben Butler, 
& Ruth Williams, We Can Rebuild It: The Plan to Transform Toothless Tiger 
ASIC, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (June 28, 2014), 
www.smh.com.au/business/we-can-rebuild-it-the-plan-to-transform-
toothless-tiger-asic-20140627-3az4m.html. 
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activities). In so doing, it explores Australia’s anomalous 
experience of large non-institutional blockholders in ASX-
listed companies and suggests that this has had an impact on 
the roles and composition of boards. This analysis reveals 
that in the early 1990s, the narrower view appears to have 
won out. That is to say that there has been a shift away from 
executive boards towards “monitoring” boards,19 with fewer 
members and more independent directors, who are expected 
to maintain minimum standards across a variety of roles.  
Yet this transition has not been rapid or particularly 
smooth (Part III). Following the corporate excesses of the late 
1980s, the Bosch Reports recommended more independent 
directors on boards, defined as excluding substantial 
shareholders. In 1992, the ASX suggested the introduction of 
mandatory requirements for independent directors. After 
strong resistance from the business community, it then 
proposed a U.K.-style “comply-or-explain” regime in 1994. 
The ASX eventually settled on an even weaker regime from 
1996, requiring only disclosures for non-executive directors 
more broadly— without having to identify independent 
directors. Only after a wave of much more serious corporate 
failures at the turn of the twenty-first century − especially 
one harming very influential blockholders (One.Tel) − did 
the ASX implement (from 2004) a requirement for listed 
companies to adopt a majority of independent directors on 
an “if not, why not” basis. Minor revisions were made in 
2007, but somewhat more stringent standards were then 
implemented in 2014. The most recent changes occurred in 
the shadow of some post-GFC legislative initiatives and case 
law that generally expanded the scope and content of duties 
                                                
	  
	  
19 See Jennifer Hill, Centro and the Monitoring Board – Legal Duties Versus 
Aspirational Ideals in Corporate Governance, 35 U. N.S.W. L. J. 341 (2012). 
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owed by directors (including independent directors).20 These 
changes were ushered in even though Australia did not 
suffer major bank failures or a recession.21 
As explained in Part IV, the ASX’s “Principles and 
Recommendations” remain the cornerstone of the Australian 
regulatory model, underpinned by Listing Rules (which 
have mandated an audit committee since 2004, and a 
remuneration committee since 2011, albeit only for the 
largest 300 companies, each requiring a majority of 
independent directors). There are comparatively and 
increasingly detailed criteria for assessing independence, 
such as whether the director has direct (or, since 2014, 
“family”) links with a “substantial” (5%+) shareholder. This 
factor differs from the U.S. and appears to be derived from 
the U.K. model, but arguably is more theoretically defensible 
in Australia given its significant blockholder tradition.22 
Another interesting development is the compromise reached 
in the 2014 ASX Principles regarding directors’ length of 
tenure, which was partly influenced by developments 
further afield such as those in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Despite these regulatory developments, there remains 
only weak Australian empirical evidence of positive effects 
of a majority-independent board on risk management and 
overall corporate performance (Part V). In Australia, as well 
                                                
	  
	  
20 See Jennifer Hill, Evolving Directors’ Duties in the Common Law World, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES 3-43 (Adolfo Paolini ed., 
Edward Elgar Publishing 2014).  
21 See generally Jennifer Hill, Why Did Australia Fare So Well in the Global 
Financial Crisis?, THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2012). 
22 Wolf-George Ringe, Independent Directors: After the Crisis, 72/2013 
OXFORD LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER (2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293394. 
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as other parts of the world, the received wisdom about 
independent directors has faced stronger critiques in the 
post Global Financial Crisis milieu.23 Some commentators 
have criticized the general approach to defining director 
independence, which they claim myopically focuses on 
avoiding certain relationships, rather than promoting 
directors’ positive attributes that might help minimize the 
impact of economy-wide conditions.24 Others urge the 
adoption of a U.S.-style approach with respect to 
relationships with significant stockholders, arguing that 
Australian directors need more “skin in the game” in order 
to enhance corporate performance.25 This point received 
support from former NSW Supreme Court Justice, Bob 
Austin. Writing in an editorial piece for Australia’s leading 
financial newspaper, he argues that it is “time for us to 
revisit the definition of independence . . . to permit and 
encourage independent directors to have more skin in the 
                                                
	  
	  
23 See generally Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board 
Independence, 92 N.C. L. REV. 855 (2014). 
24 See Suzanne Le Mire & George Gilligan, Developing a More Complete 
Understanding of the Independence of Corporate Directors, 2012-35 U. OF 
ADELAIDE L. RES. PAPER (2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2180671. See also 
Sally Wheeler, Independent directors and corporate governance, 27 AUSTL. J. 
CORP. L. 168 (2012); Neil Dunbar, The Role and Value of Independent 
directors in modern Australian corporate governance, 30 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 
312 (2012). 
25 See Marc-Oliver Fischer & Peter L. Swan, Does Board Independence 
Improve Firm Performance? Outcome of a Quasi-Natural Experiment, U. 
N.S.W., FIN. RES. NETWORK (2013), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312325; Pamela Hanrahan & Tim 
Bednall, Independence of Directors Affiliated with Substantial Shareholders: 
Issues of Law and Corporate Governance, 33 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 239 (2015). 
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game.”26 Seemingly frustrated with the almost Frankenstein-
like expansion of the ASX Corporate Governance’s 
conception of independence, Dr. Austin reminds us that 
“investor independence is a different kind of independence 
and a different governance strategy, which has been bolted 
onto the management independence idea.”27  
Though speculative, a subconscious “status quo bias” 
may also be at work. This problem may be compounded by 
interest group politics. There is now a large (and well-
networked) anointed group of incumbent independent 
directors, as well as various professional associations 
involved in “training” them. The resulting lack of public 
discussion is unfortunate. Many problems remain to be 
properly explored from theoretical, empirical, and 
comparative vantage points (Part VI). An analysis of 
historical and current developments in Australia regarding 
independent directors, then, the complex issues involved, 
and some possible ways forward for stock markets 
(including for the U.S.) where concentrated stockholdings 
have become a major contemporary concern. 
 
II. BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN AUSTRALIA’S LISTED    
      COMPANIES 
  
                                                
	  
	  
26 Robert Austin, Directors Should Have More Skin in the Game, AUSTL. FIN. 
REV. (July 31, 2014), http://www.afr.com/opinion/our-
writers/directors-should-have-more-skin-in-the-game-20140730-jk75h. 
Like Swan, Austin maintains that “investor independence is not 
necessary in order to achieve the board’s independence from 
management,” but appears to diverge from Swan’s view regarding 
majority-led ID boards, declaring that the “majority of the board should 
be independent from management.” 
27 Id.  
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A.   ROLES OF BOARDS 
  
Scholarly debates on the supposed roles for directors 
on listed companies’ boards have raged on since the early 
1990s. A more expansive view (encompassing a broad range 
of responsibilities) was taken by a committee chaired by 
Henry Bosch, an eminent businessman who had led ASIC’s 
predecessor from 1985 to 1990. This committee produced a 
report in May of 1991 for the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors (AICD: the Bosch Report),28 updated in 
1993 and 1995, with significant parallels to the Cadbury 
Report finalized in the U.K. in December of 1992.29 By 
contrast, an influential judgment of the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales later suggested that contemporary boards 
would normally be expected only to set corporate objectives, 
appoint the CEO, and monitor progress.30 An analysis by 
                                                
	  
	  
28 Corporate Practices and Conduct, WORKING GROUP OF THE AUSTRALIAN 
INSTITUTE OF COMPANY DIRECTORS ET AL. (1991) [hereinafter Bosch Report 
1991]. 
29 COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
REPORT (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter Cadbury Report], 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf. 
30 AWA Ltd. v. Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR 759 (Austl.). On appeal, instead of 
insisting on a clear demarcation between the roles of executive and non-
executive directors, the majority of the NSW Court of Appeal, in Daniels 
(formerly practising as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) v. Anderson (1995) 37 
NSWLR 438, 505 (Austl.), emphasized that a director’s duty “will vary 
according to the size and business of the particular company and the 
experience or skills that the director held himself or herself out to have in 
support of appointment to the office” (per Clarke and Sheller JJA). This 
decision caused widespread consternation in the business community 
and led to a cacophony of calls for the clear differentiation between the 
duties and standard of “care and diligence” required from executive and 
non-executive directors, by way of legislative intervention. See, e.g., 
CORPORATE LAW ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM, AUSTRALIAN 
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Professor Fred Hilmer (the “Hilmer Report”) also favored a 
narrower view.31 
The broader approach has been favored since the 
establishment of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
Corporate Governance Council in 2002, comprising of 
business, shareholder, and industry groups. The Third 
Edition (2014) of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (in effect from 2014) mirrors the First 
Edition (2003) and the Second (2007) by envisaging a broad 
range of responsibilities for boards of directors, albeit on an 
“if not, why not” basis. Pursuant to Principle 1 (to “lay solid 
foundations for management and oversight”), 
Recommendation 1.1 requires listed companies to disclose 
“(a) the respective roles and responsibilities of its board and 
management; and (b) those matters expressly reserved to the 
board and those delegated to management.” The non-
binding Commentary, which does not in itself trigger “if not, 
why not” disclosure obligations, states that: 
 
Usually the board of a listed entity will be responsible 
for: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
GOVERNMENT, DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
FACILITATING INNOVATION AND PROTECTING INVESTORS 43-45 (Australian 
Government Publishing Service 1997). For recent case law, arguably 
confirming a more expansive view of directors’ duties, see Part III below. 
31 Helen Bird, The Rise and Fall of the Independent Director, 5 AUSTL. J. 
CORP. L. 235 (1995). See generally Dunbar, supra note 24. Hilmer was, at 
the time, the Director and Dean of the Australian Graduate School of 
Management; from June 2006, he became Vice-Chancellor at UNSW. 
Hilmer has also been a director of Westfield (a major property 
developer) from 2001 and CEO of Fairfax (a major newspaper group) 
from 1998 to 2005. 
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•   providing leadership and setting the strategic 
objectives of the entity; 
•   appointing the chair and, if the entity has one, the 
deputy chair and/or the “senior independent 
director”; 
•   appointing, and when necessary replacing, the CEO; 
•   approving the appointment, and when necessary 
replacement, of other senior executives; 
•   overseeing management’s implementation of the 
entity’s strategic objectives and its performance 
generally; 
•   approving operating budgets and major capital 
expenditure; 
•   overseeing the integrity of the entity’s accounting and 
corporate reporting systems, including the external 
audit; 
•   overseeing the entity’s process for making timely and 
balanced disclosure of all material information 
concerning the entity that a reasonable person would 
expect to have a material effect on the price or value 
of the entity’s securities; 
•   ensuring that the entity has in place an appropriate 
risk management framework and setting the risk 
appetite within which the board expects management 
to operate; 
•   approving the entity’s remuneration framework; and 
•   monitoring the effectiveness of the entity’s 
governance practices. 32 
                                                
	  
	  
32 See Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations: Third Edition, 
ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 5-8 (Mar. 2014), 
www.asx.com.au/regulation/corporate-governance-council.htm 
586 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
 
Footnote 10 adds that “[s]ome of these matters may 
be delegated to a committee of the board, with the board 
retaining the ultimate oversight and decision-making power 
in respect of the matters so delegated.”33 In fact, as 
mentioned below (Part II.2), larger listed companies 
commonly have: 
 
•   audit committees: to monitor compliance (mandated 
from 2004 under ASX Listing Rules);  
•   remuneration committees: to advise on the pay 
packages of executives and directors (mandated since 
2011 for ASX 300 companies); and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
[hereinafter ASX Third]; cf. Reegan Grayson-Morison & Ian Ramsey, 
Responsibilities of the Board of Directors: A Research Note, 32 COMPANY & 
SEC. L. J. 69, 77 (2014) (noting many similarities in Board charters 
disclosed by ASX Top 20 and 10 randomly selected small capitalization 
listed companies: 
 These common responsibilities include responsibility for the 
strategic direction of the company, budget/financial approval/financial 
performance, appointment and performance of the CEO and senior 
management, risk management policy, reviewing/monitoring corporate 
governance policies and practices, and monitoring capital management, 
including approval of major capital expenditure. There are, however, 
some notable differences with regard to responsibilities such as 
monitoring the remuneration framework, overseeing succession 
planning, corporate social responsibility, and review of diversity 
initiatives and progress. Possible reasons for these differences were 
explored including the top 20 companies being under more pressure 
from large investors and others to demonstrate their commitment to 
these issues.). 
33 This is consistent with those provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 
that concern delegation. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 198D, 190 
(Austl.). 
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•   nomination committees: to advise on appointing 
directors as well as the CEO (still less commonly 
found). 
 
The Commentary to Recommendation 1.1 further explains 
that: 
 
Management will usually be responsible for 
implementing the strategic objectives and 
operating within the risk appetite set by the 
board and for all other aspects of the day-to-
day running of the entity. It is also responsible 
for providing the board with accurate, timely 
and clear information to enable the board to 
perform its responsibilities.34 
 
The role and responsibility of the board could be set 
out in a board charter, its annual report, or in some other 
document published on the entity’s website. That document 
could usefully set out the role and responsibility of the chair 
and, if the listed entity has one, the role and responsibility of 
the deputy chair, and/or the “senior independent director.” 
It could also contain the entity’s policy on when and how 
directors may seek independent professional advice at the 
expense of the entity (which generally should be whenever 
directors, especially non-executive directors, judge such 
advice necessary for them to discharge their responsibilities 
as directors). 
The concept of the “senior independent director,” 
                                                
	  
	  
34 ASX Third, supra note 32, at 8. 
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familiar in the U.K., but less so in Australia,35 is later 
mentioned in the Commentary on Recommendation 2.5. 
This recommendation states, “the chair of the board of a 
listed entity should be an independent director and, in 
particular, should not be the same person as the CEO of the 
entity.”36 
	  
    B. BOARD SIZE AND COMPOSITION 
 
A recent Credit Suisse study investigating the 
connection between board size and firm performance of 
companies drawn from leading ASX200 firms for the period 
2008-2013 contends that for companies with a market 
capitalization of $5 billion, nine to eleven board members 
produce the best shareholder returns.37 For companies with 
a lower market capitalization, the optimal number of board 
                                                
	  
	  
35 See generally Alice Klettner, Thomas Clarke, & Michael Adams, 
Corporate Governance Reform: An Empirical Study of the Changing Roles and 
Responsibilities of Australian Boards and Directors, 24 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 
148 (2010). 
36 ASX Third, supra note 32, at 18 (emphasis added). The Commentary 
states that: “If the chair is not an independent director, a listed entity 
should consider the appointment of an independent director as the 
deputy chair or as the ‘senior independent director’, who can fulfil the 
role whenever the chair is conflicted. Even where the chair is an 
independent director, having a deputy chair or senior independent 
director can also assist the board in reviewing the performance of the 
chair and in providing a separate channel of communication for security 
holders (especially where those communications concern the chair).” Id.  
37 CREDIT SUISSE, OPTIMAL BOARD MEMBER NUMBERS PRODUCE THE BEST 
SHAREHOLDER RETURNS (2014), https://doc.research-and-
analytics.csfb.com/docView?language=ENG&format=PDF&source_id=c
splusresearchcp&document_id=1045123501&serialid=VVLqr3kzN7u%2
B6s1KERmJf9g6fAzZM6jWCpj7f0U0x%2BE%3D. 
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members lies between six and eight.38 Unfortunately, that 
study is completely silent on the breakdown of NEDs, IDs, 
or executive directors, so we must look elsewhere for a 
conception of board composition. 
In September of 2013, the Australian Council of 
Superannuation Investors (ACSI) published its 12th Annual 
Research Report on “Board Composition and Non-Executive 
Director Pay in the Top 200 Companies: 2012,” analyzing 
ninety-four of the largest qualifying companies in the 
Standard & Poors/ASX 200 Index as of June 30, 2012, (ASX 
100) and eighty-six from the next 100 largest companies 
(ASX 101-200).39 An executive recruitment firm, Korn Ferry, 
has also published its “2010 Board of Directors Study” based 
on a survey of Australia’s 300 largest companies, by market 
capitalization as at June 30, 2010.40 Some key results from 
these studies are summarized below in Table 1: 
 
                                                
	  
	  
38 Id. 
39 Board Composition and Non-Executive Director Pay in Top 100 Companies: 
2012, AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPERANNUATION INVESTORS (ACSI) RES. 
PAPER (Sept. 2013), http://www.acsi.org.au/board-comp-a-
ned.html?layout=blog [hereinafter ACSI 2012] (with earlier reports 
dating back to 2002). 
40 2010 Board of Directors Study: Australia and New Zealand, KORN FERRY 
INSTITUTE (Dec. 9, 2010), www.kornferryinstitute.com/reports-
insights/2010-board-directors-study-australia-and-new-zealand. 
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Table 1: Snapshot of Australian Board Size and 
Composition 
 
 Number 
of 
directors 
on boards 
Proportion of 
NEDs & IDs 
Committees CEO 
separate 
from Chair 
Average / 
Median Fees 
of Non-
executive 
Directors (& 
Chairs) 
ASX 
100 
(2012) 
8.5 
(average) 
83% NEDs, of 
which 88% 
IDs (so 73% 
IDs) 
n/a 99% (93/94)  $218,434 / 
$203,250 
 
(& $481,415 
/ $450,924) 
ASX 
101-200 
(2012) 
6.2 79%, of which 
70% (so 56% 
IDs) 
n/a  87%(75/86) $134,981 / 
$115,029 
(& $225,534 
/ $193,230) 
 
Top 300 
(2010) 
4–9 (89% 
of firms) 
77% NEDs 
(82% for ASX 
50) 
Audit (97%), 
Remuneratio
n (89%), 
Nomination 
(30%) 
n/a $124,985 / 
$102,500  
 
(& $241,687/ 
$174,000) 
 
Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) clearly form a large 
majority on boards, and most are also Independent Directors 
(IDs). This is especially true in Australia’s biggest companies 
(the ASX 100, even compared to the ASX 101-200 
companies).41 A recent econometric study led by Professor 
                                                
	  
	  
41 Dane Etheridge, Boards of a Feather Flock Together: Board Networks 
Among ASX Firms, 2012 FINANCIAL MARKETS & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
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Peter Swan (discussed further in Part V.2 below), which 
examines the performance of the largest 500 ASX listed 
companies between 2001-2011, also reported broadly 
consistent findings: 75% NEDs, with 32% IDs, and 39% 
“gray” (non-independent NED) directors, as well as an 
average (and median) board size of around six directors.42 
The 2013 ACSI report suggests that the proportion of 
IDs in ASX 100 companies in 2012 (73%, or 585 out of 797 
directorships) has grown considerably since 2004 (50%).43 It 
notes though that the jump in 2005 (to 65%) arose because 
“ACSI [previously] classified all directors with more than 
nine years service on a board as affiliated [i.e. non-
independent] and from 2005 only those directors who had 
spent more than twenty years on a board were considered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
CONFERENCE 10 (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1972254 (noting 
that over 150 new listings were added from 2005-2006 alone, and that the 
number of ASC listed companies increased 46% from 2000-2007, while 
the number of directors only rose by 10%). Nonetheless, the largest 50 
listed companies represent about 70% of total ASX market capitalization. 
Id. at 32. 
42 Fischer & Swan, supra note 25, at 2, 12-13, 49, Table 2; cf. Peter L. Swan 
& David Forsberg, Does Board ‘Independence’ Destroy Corporate Value?, 
27TH AUSTRALASIAN FIN. & BANK. CONF. PAPER (2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2312325. 
43 This upward trend has continued, with the proportion of NEDs held 
by IDs rising slightly to 75.6% of all directorships in 2013. Board 
Composition and Non-Executive Director Pay in Top 200 Companies: 2013, 
THE 13TH ANNUAL ACSI STUDY INTO S&P/ASX 200 BOARDS 10 (Nov. 
2014), 
www.acsi.org.au/images/stories/ACSIDocuments/generalresearchpubl
ic/Board_Comp_and_Non-
Exec_Director_Pay_in_Top_200_Companies_2013.Nov14.pdf 
[hereinafter ACSI 2013]. 
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affiliated.”44 When comparing 2012 with 2005, the growth in 
proportions of IDs was less dramatic, but still noteworthy – 
including in 2009 (where the proportion rose from 65.5% in 
2008 to 69%).  
Yet, as elaborated in Parts III and IV below, Professor 
Swan’s study notes significant increases in large listed ASX 
companies adopting a majority of IDs since 2003 (when the 
ASX Corporate Governance Principles first required this, albeit 
on an “if not, why not” basis). Specifically, his study found 
that, in 2003, about 19% of firms had a majority of IDs (172 of 
841 firms that year), rising to 57% by 2011 (551 of 969 firms), 
and then to 59% (including firms that had a majority of IDs 
before 2003).45 
Even though the ASX only introduced a loose 
disclosure-based regime from 1996-2002, the largest 
Australian companies saw a significant increase in NED 
appointments and proportions on boards since 1992. This 
trend continued with a gradual expansion of IDs over the 
ensuing decade.46 Yet, writing in 2002, Henry Bosch 
                                                
	  
	  
44 Id. at 11 n.10: “[T]he change in definition was effective from the 2nd 
edition of the ACSI Guidelines, released in 2005.”  
45 Fischer & Swan, supra note 25, at 9. 
46 By 1996, for 348 ASX 500 companies excluding banks and mining 
companies, Geoffrey Kiel and Gavin Nicholson reported an average 
board size of around 6 (compared to some estimates of 8.5 in the U.K. 
and around 12 in the U.S. around that time) and only about a quarter of 
firms (23%) where the CEO was also the Board chair (similar to the U.K., 
although 47% from 1990-1995, and much lower than the U.S., at 82% 
from 1981-1995). Geoffrey Kiel & Gavin Nicholson, Board composition and 
corporate performance: How the Australian experience informs contrasting 
theories of corporate governance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 189, 
193 (2003). This was also true in 1995 for the largest 100 companies. See 
G. P. Stapledon & Jeffrey Lawrence, Board Composition, Structure and 
Independence in Australia’s Largest Listed Companies, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 
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suggested that: “Since [IDs] often owe their positions to the 
controlling shareholders it is not unknown for them to 
suppress any misgivings they may have about arguments 
which happen to work in favor of the individual interests of 
controllers.”47 Contemporaneous qualitative empirical 
research also documents serious problems faced by IDs in 
freely accessing the information necessary for the effective 
discharge of their duties.48 In other words, the actual 
independence and impact of IDs on corporate governance 
seems to have been less than expected from the reported 
statistics. 
For ASX 100 companies, the 2014 ACSI Report finds a 
general plateauing in NED (and probably therefore now ID) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
150 (1997). A Korn Ferry survey of 200 companies in 1992 had noted an 
average board size of eight (ten for large companies), comprising 75% 
NEDs (jumping from around 50% over 1982-1992, with 60% appointing 
NEDs in 1992). Bird, supra note 34, at 253-54. Analyzing the largest 136 
listed companies from 1994-2000 (excluding financial and utility 
companies), one study found an average board size of 7.8, comprising 
54% IDs – albeit defined as not being “current or former employees, 
[having] business dealings with the firm, or [being] related (by family) to 
executive directors” Peter K. Pham, Jo-Ann Suchard, & Jason Zien, 
Corporate Governance and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from Australian 
Companies, 24 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 84, 86-87 (2012); cf. Part IV below; 
see also Reza Monem, Determinants of board structure: Evidence from 
Australia, 9 J. OF CONTEMP. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2013) (analyzing small-, 
medium-, and large-sized ASX listed firms, finding for the large firms a 
median board size of 6.26 including 4.45 NEDs and with the top 20 
shareholders having 67% average ownership). 
47 Henry Bosch, The Changing Face of Corporate Governance, 25 U. N.S.W. L. 
J. 270, 290 (2002). 
48 M. Nowak & M. McCabe, Information Costs and the Role of the 
Independent Corporate Director, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 300 
(2003). 
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board representation.49 This result may well be due to the 
growth and consolidation of a cadre of “professional NEDs,” 
defined as directors holding more than one board seat in the 
sample group(s). As Table 2 illustrates, this proportion of 
multiple directorships grew from 2001 (30.6%) to 2006 
(45.1%), although it had fallen by 2012 (33.4%) and remained 
largely unchanged in 2013.50  
 
Table 2: Snapshot of Multiple Directorships held by NEDs 
 
Sample group Year Number 
of 
NEDs 
Proportion of 
NEDs held by 
professional 
NEDs 
Held by: 
ASX 200 2012 1091 34% 170 persons 
ASX 101-200 2012 426 8.4% 18 
ASX 100 2012 665 33.4% 100 
ASX 100 2006 626 45.1% 123 
ASX 100 2001 536 30.6% 72 
 
                                                
	  
	  
49 ACSI 2013, supra note 42, at 10-11.  
50 Id. at 16. However, the average tenure of NEDs in ASX 100 companies 
has not significantly increased in recent years, with the figure almost 
always hovering around 5.5-5.9 years. There was, for example, a 
marginal increase in average NED tenure from 5.8 years (2012) to 5.9 
years (2013). Id. at 26. An anomalous year was 2007, with average NED 
tenure at 5.1 years. See Board Composition and Non-Executive Director Pay 
in Top 100 Companies: 2008, ACSI RES. PAPER 16 (Oct. 2009), 
http://www.acsi.org.au/images/stories/ACSIDocuments/detailed_res
earch_papers/board_comp_and_non-
exec_director_pay_in_top_100_companies_2008.oct_09.pdf [hereinafter 
ACSI 2008]. 
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In 2012, 170 professional NEDs held 34% of the 1091 
NED positions in the top 200 ASX companies (and 28.6% of 
all directorships). Similarly, in 2013, 163 professional NEDs 
held 33% of 1,123 NED positions in the top 200 ASX 
companies.51 One professional NED, Peter Day, held five 
board seats in ASX 200 companies: four of those in ASX 100 
companies.52 An analysis of the top 200 ASX companies 
conducted in 2012 by a leading Australian newspaper 
further supports this penchant for multiple directorships. It 
found that of 1539 directors (both executives and NEDs), 205 
held positions on multiple boards. Some of “the most 
interesting connections,” the study revealed, “are at one or 
two degrees of separation from any particular company.”53 
The phenomenon of multiple directorships is not the 
exclusive domain of men. While women were generally 
under-represented among both NEDs and executive 
directors, the ASCI study found that women were more 
                                                
	  
	  
51 ACSI 2013, supra note 42, at 16. 
52 Id. 
53 Marc Moncrieff, Unravelling the Ties that Connect and Direct, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Aug. 18, 2012), 
www.smh.com.au/business/unravelling-the-ties-that-connect-and-
direct-20120817-24dxj.html (adding that “these are connections that 
would not be explicit from company disclosures unless a reader were to 
pursue a particular director’s associations from company to company, as 
we have done. For example, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto are the largest 
and second-largest companies listed on the ASX if measured by the total 
value of their shares. They are also, perhaps, the exchange's most 
prominent rivals. Yet, they are connected at a single degree of separation 
- Rio director Richard Goodmanson shares the Qantas board with John 
Schubert, a BHP director”). For similar observations on direct and 
indirect board interlocks as of 2007, especially among directors in the 50 
largest ASX companies, see Etheridge, supra note 40, at 32-36. 
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likely to be professional NEDs.54 (The 2013 ASCI Report 
reaffirms these findings.)55 As of June 20, 2012, some notable 
female NEDs include: Catherine Livingstone AO (Non-
Executive Chairman for Telstra Corporation and NED for 
Worley Parsons and Macquarie Group) and Carolyn 
Hewson AO (NED at BHP Billiton, Westpac Banking 
Corporation and Stockland).56 Moreover, according to the 
2014 ASCI Report, the average tenure for female NEDs has 
increased from 3.8 years (with a median of 2.1) in 2011 to 4.2 
years (with a median of 2.8) in 2013.57 
While these developments are to be lauded, there is 
real concern that the appointment of women to the boards of 
ASX-listed companies following the ASX’s 2010 “if not, why 
not” disclosure rule regarding gender diversity is a mere 
                                                
	  
	  
54 ACSI 2012, supra note 38, at 14-16 (“Of the 878 persons holding non-
executive director roles at S&P/ASX 200 company boards in the 2012 
sample:  
•   707 held just one non-executive board seat at an ASX 200 
company. This included 84 of the women in the sample (52% of 
all female directors) and 623 of the men (or 60% of all male 
directors in the sample).  
•   137 held two board seats, including 33 women (21.3% of female 
non-executive directors) and 104 men (10.1% of all men).  
•   27 held three board seats, including eight women (5.2% of 
women) and 19 men (2% of men).  
•   Six people held four board seats, two of which were men and 
four of which were women.  
•   One man, Garry Hounsell, held five board seats (four in the Top 
100 and one in the ASX 101–200).” (citation omitted)). 
55 ACSI 2013, supra note 42, at 17. 
56 Cultivating Greatness in the Boardroom, KORN FERRY INSTITUTE 9, 11 (June 
2012), http://www.kornferry.com/institute/458-cultivating-greatness-
in-the-boardroom-what-makes-an-exceptional-non-executive-director-in-
australasia. 
57 ACSI 2013, supra note 42, at 26. 
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box-ticking exercise. A recent Korn Ferry Australasia survey 
of fifty-seven female directors appointed to ASX 200 boards 
since the 2010 change remarked that while the majority of 
respondents reported improvements in board culture, 22% 
of respondents lamented the apparent fixation “on the idea 
that having one woman on the board ticks the box.”58 Those 
respondents therefore claim that boards have not made “any 
structural or philosophical changes to attract and appoint 
more women.”59 Other commentators have been more 
outspoken in their critique of board makeup, claiming that 
“possessors of just the right color, [caliber] and class of 
penis” are being elevated to these positions.60 Nevertheless, 
by making available on its website various resources that 
listed companies may wish to consult with when seeking to 
implement such diversity recommendations,61 as well as 
(once more) commissioning an independent analysis on their 
                                                
	  
	  
58 Beyond If Not, Why Not: The Pathway to Directorship for Women in 
Leadership, KORN FERRY INSTITUTE 15 (May 2014), 
www.kornferryinstitute.com/reports-insights/beyond-if-not-why-not-
pathway-directorship-women-leadership. 
59 Id. at 16, Figure 5; see also Alana Schetzer, Women Stall on Reaching 
Australia’s Highest Rungs, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Nov. 1, 2014), 
www.smh.com.au/business/women-stall-on-reaching-corporate-
australias-highest-rungs-20141031-11eulk.html. 
60 Jane Caro, Get Real Ladies, Quotas on Boards Are For Losers. We want 
winners!, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2014), 
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/05/get-real-ladies-
quotas-on-boards-are-for-losers-we-want-winners. 
61 See, e.g., Diversity Resources, ASX, 
http://www.asx.com.au/regulation/corporate-governance-
council/diversity-resources.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).  
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adoption since coming into effect,62 the ASX evidently 
continues to treat its gender diversity initiative seriously. 
Interestingly, the issue of diversity has taken on a 
wider import, with some commentators openly questioning 
the lack of cultural and ethnic diversity on Australian 
boards.63 The 2010 amendments to the ASX Principles 
include Recommendation 3.2: the adoption of a “diversity 
policy” and its disclosure (or at least a summary) of that 
policy. The commentary defines diversity as including, but 
not limited to, “gender, age, ethnicity and cultural 
background.”64 Despite this inclusive definition – expanded 
in the Third Edition of the ASX Principles65 – measurable 
                                                
	  
	  
62 See, e.g., ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations on 
Diversity, KPMG (2014), www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-
compliance/kpmg-report-diversity-2014.pdf. For the second full year of 
reporting on diversity, the KPMG report notes that 98% of ASX 200 
companies in 2013 had a diversity policy, an increase from 93% in 2013. 
Id. at 11. 
63 See, e.g., Jean J. Du Plessis, Ingo Saenger, & Richard Foster, Board 
Diversity or Gender Diversity? Perspectives from Europe, Australia and South 
Africa, 17 DEAKIN L.R. 207 (2012); Capitalising on Culture: A Study of the 
Cultural Origins of ASX 200 Business Leaders, DIVERSITY COUNCIL 
AUSTRALIA (2013), http://www.dca.org.au/dca-research/capitalising-
on-culture.html; L. McNamara, Lack of Cultural Diversity a ‘Risk’, THE 
AUSTRALIAN (Jan. 3, 2013), www.theaustralian.com.au/business/lack-of-
cultural-diversity-a-risk/story-e6frg8zx-1226546776157; Leo D’Angelo 
Fisher, Know-how in the Asian century, BRW (May 16, 2013), 
www.brw.com.au/p/leadership/know_how_in_the_asian_century_Kn
USJGElduyjmNNyxjCVRP. 
64 Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations with 2010 
Amendments: Second Edition, ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 24 
(June 2010), http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-
compliance/cg_principles_recommendations_with_2010_amendments.p
df [hereinafter ASX Second Amended]. 
65 ASX Third, supra note 32, at Box 1.5 (stating that “diversity not only 
includes gender diversity but also includes matters of age, disability, 
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objectives and metrics reporting relate only to gender 
diversity (ASX 2nd ed., Recommendation 3.3 and 3.4; ASX 3rd 
ed., Recommendation 1.5). As a result, there is little, if any, 
data collation of ethnic and cultural board diversity on ASX 
listed companies, and to our knowledge, nothing by way of 
Australian empirical studies exploring this burgeoning 
issue. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that the latest 
or emerging “big trend” is adding an Asian director to the 
board.66 This is consistent with Australia’s accelerating turn 
towards Asia in the twenty-first century, promoted by the 
Gillard Government in a White Paper released in 2012.67  
Thus, a relatively small group of individuals is likely 
to continue to dominate directorships in larger Australian 
companies (especially NED and ID positions). This tendency 
may well intensify − somewhat ironically − as the ASX and 
corporate sector entrench gender diversity initiatives aimed 
at encouraging the appointment of women on boards 
(outlined next in Part III). Furthermore, limiting metrics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
ethnicity, marital or family status, religious or cultural background, 
sexual orientation and gender identity”). 
66 Peter Durkin, Meet the Directors From Hell, THE AUSTL. FIN. REV. (June 
21, 2012), 
http://www.afr.com/p/national/meet_the_directors_from_hell_X0het1
wlEaJbuTHLWC4C8H. 
67 The (more center-right) Abbott Government, elected in 2013, however, 
has quietly removed it from official websites, except for an archive copy 
at 
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/168973846?selectedversion=NBD4961093
1. For critiques of this shift, see Matt Wade, What Happened to the Asian 
Century?, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 1, 2014), 
www.smh.com.au/comment/what-happened-to-the-asian-century-
20140930-10nxt9.html; see also Mark Beeson, Is This the End of the ‘Asian 
Century’?, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 29, 2013), 
http://theconversation.com/is-this-the-end-of-the-asian-century-19616. 
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reporting and the creation of measurable objectives to 
gender issues is unlikely to assist the promotion of more 
culturally diverse boards, notwithstanding the more 
expansive definition of diversity discussed above. 
  
III. HISTORICAL MILESTONES 
 
Scholarly debates on corporate governance and 
regulatory changes dating back to the early 1990s have 
underpinned the growth of IDs in Australia’s listed 
companies, particularly the larger ones. This Part outlines 
major developments in the Australian corporate governance 
landscape concerning IDs.  
 
A.   THE BOSCH COMMITTEE REPORT AND THE ASX’S FIRST 
DISCLOSURE REGIME 
 
Australia’s stock market crash in 1987, coupled with 
corporate failures in the U.K. and the resultant Cadbury 
Committee Report (finalized and released in December of 
1992)68 strongly influenced the Bosch Committee Report 
(May of 1991, revised somewhat in 1993 and 1995). The 
Bosch Report recommended that Australian listed 
companies should have: 
 
•   boards consisting of a majority of NEDs, of whom a 
majority should be IDs; and 
•   audit, remuneration, and nomination committees, 
each with a majority of IDs. 
 
                                                
	  
	  
68 Bird, supra note 31, at 238-46. 
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The Bosch Committee, which included 
representatives from the ASX, the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors (AICD), which was created from a 
merger in 1990, and the Law Council of Australia (the peak 
body for barristers and solicitors) envisaged independence 
as being freedom from both management and “any other 
external influence that might detract from their ability to act 
in the interest of the company as a whole.”69 Independence 
was presumptively satisfied if the ID was not: 
 
•   a substantial shareholder; 
•   employed by the company as an executive within the 
last few years; 
•   a professional adviser to the company; 
•   a significant customer or supplier; or  
•   in any significant contractual relationship with the 
company other than as a director. 
 
This general definition and the Report’s 
recommended board composition closely tracks the 
approach of the Cadbury Committee.70 Intriguingly, in its 
                                                
	  
	  
69 Corporate Practices and Conduct, WORKING GROUP OF THE AUSTRALIAN 
INSTITUTE OF COMPANY DIRECTORS ET AL. 16 (1993) [hereinafter Bosch 
Report 1993]. 
70 The Bosch Report recommended remuneration, nomination and audit 
committees, each with a majority of IDs, with sufficient IDs on the board 
overall so that their views could carry significant weight. While 
acknowledging that ID numbers would vary with board size, the Report 
mentioned that “it is unlikely that less than two will be able to exercise 
sufficient influence and it is desirable that at least one third of the Board 
should be genuinely independent.” Bosch Report 1991, supra note 28, at 
16-7. Similarly, the Cadbury Report recommended a remuneration 
committee, a nomination committee (with a majority of NEDs) and an 
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first edition published in 1991, the Bosch Report noted that 
while personal or professional associations with the 
company, its officers, or shareholders, should not preclude 
NEDs from serving as directors,  
 
it is [nevertheless] a useful safeguard to 
appoint to the Board at least two directors who 
have no [personal or professional] association 
with the company or its officers or a particular 
shareholder. The independence of a NED may 
be defined as not having: 
1. A contractual relationship with the 
company other than the office of Director (and 
therefore not subject to the control or influence 
of any other director or group of directors). 
2. Any relationship with the company 
which could affect the exercise of independent 
judgment.71 
 
In its second edition in 1993, the Bosch Report added 
that independence is “more likely to be assured” when the 
director is not “a substantial shareholder” of the company.72 
The Cadbury Report, published in 1992, instead 
recommended that a majority of NEDs should be 
independent, meaning that “apart from their director’ fees 
and shareholdings, they should be independent of 
management and free from any business or other 
relationship which could materially interfere with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
audit committee (all NEDs, with a majority of IDs), thus a minimum of 3 
NEDs including 2 IDs. Cadbury Report, supra note 29. 
71 Bosch Report 1991, supra note 28, at 6 (emphasis added). 
72 Bosch Report 1993, supra note 68, at 16. 
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exercise of their independent judgment.”73 This difference is 
all the more interesting, given that the Bosch Committee also 
had an eye on American developments that emphasized the 
importance of NEDs and IDs, such as the American Law 
Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance (released on 
March 31, 1992, but developed since 1978) and the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) listing rules. Yet the U.S. continues 
to define independence to exclude being a substantial 
shareholder.74 Apparently the Bosch Committee came up 
with this definition due to concerns that strong individuals, 
often with significant shareholdings, had abused their 
positions on Australian boards, resulting in major corporate 
collapses in the late 1980s and the response (led by the 
Business Council) to establish the Bosch Committee to 
restore public faith in listed companies.75 
                                                
	  
	  
73 Cadbury Report, supra note 29, at para. 4.12 (emphasis added). 
However, the Cadbury Committee did “regard it as good practice for 
[NEDs] not to participate in share option schemes.” Id. at para. 4.13. 
74 The NYSE had required since 1956 at least two “outside” directors 
(NEDs) on listed company boards, and since 1978 an audit committee 
comprising only IDs. The non-binding ALI Principles recommended a 
majority of directors free of any “significant relationship” with the 
company’s senior executives (unless a majority of its shares were owned 
by a single person, a family group or a control group. in which case it 
should have at least three such IDs). 
75 Telephone interview with Henry Bosch AO, Former Chairman, 
National Companies and Securities Commission (Mar. 16, 2015). Another 
response was the restriction on partial takeovers. Mr. Bosch also noted 
that the idea did not come from (then protean) institutional investor 
groups in Australia, as they did not have a formal organization at the 
time and were not on the original Committee. (Instead several large 
institutional investors responded favorably during the public 
consultation on the first draft Report, and released a public statement 
that companies that adopted the final Report recommendations would 
be looked on positively when making investment decisions.) The Bosch 
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In September of 1994, the ASX released a Discussion 
Paper that was heavily influenced by the Bosch Report, 
which the ASX noted had received a fairly poor response 
among listed companies. It proposed a new ASX Listing 
Rule requiring companies to include in their annual reports 
(from 1996) a statement as to whether they had followed its 
“Schedule of Corporate Governance Practices,” and to 
explain why they had not followed specified practices. This 
proposal was similar to the Bosch Report’s recommendation; 
this “comply or explain” approach was favored by the 
Cadbury Committee, and had been adopted in the U.K. since 
1992. The ASX then invited public comment on the desirable 
schedule benchmarks for a minimum number of NEDs and 
(more tentatively) IDs, as well as for audit, remuneration, 
and nomination committees (including a majority of IDs). 
The caution with which the ASX proceeded here was 
apparently related to the negative responses to its 1992 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Committee was also aware that corporate governance was being 
examined in the U.K. in the wake of the Maxwell fiasco, but it had 
already had public consultations on its draft Report before the Cadbury 
Committee was established in May of 1991. It was only in 1995 that the 
Australian Investment Managers’ Association (AIMA) published the first 
edition of what become know as its “Blue Book” guidelines for 
investment decisions, including recommendations on director 
independence defined largely in line with the Bosch Reports (including, 
importantly and even then somewhat controversially, independence 
from substantial shareholders). See Hanrahan & Bednall, supra note 25. 
See generally FRANK L. CLARKE ET AL., CORPORATE COLLAPSE: 
ACCOUNTING, REGULATORY, AND ETHICAL FAILURE (2003) (discussing 
Australia’s corporate collapses in the 1980s, including in groups of 
companies where small shareholdings were leveraged into controlling 
interests). 
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Exposure Draft setting out a new listing rule mandating a 
minimum IDs requirement.76 
Even this watered-down proposal proved 
controversial. It referred to the Hilmer Committee Report 
(entitled Strictly Boardroom, published in 1993), which was 
compiled by representatives from law schools, the ASX, 
investment advisers, merchant bankers, insurers, unions, 
and company directors, under the chairmanship of Professor 
Fred Hilmer. That report argued that the key functions of 
boards were to monitor and enhance corporate performance, 
but too much attention was being focused on the former. It 
recommended that guidelines on board make-up confused 
directors as to their responsibilities, whereas their interaction 
as a group is essential. The Hilmer Report did not seek to 
define the role of NEDs, instead urging them to prioritize 
performance responsibilities. It rejected requirements for IDs 
− except for the audit committee, where it recommended a 
majority of IDs that had no business relationship with the 
company that might impede independent judgment − 
because the role envisaged for IDs overall, as “quasi 
auditors” was perceived as unconstructive and unrealistic. 
One academic response to the 1994 ASX Discussion Paper 
similarly elaborated on various “environmental limitations” 
on IDs, like structural bias in (re)appointments, intimidation 
by management, a lack of cohesive power, questions as to 
who would monitor such monitors, and a lack of adequate 
resources and experience.77 
Following this strong resistance, the ASX backed off 
of introducing a U.K.-style comply-or-explain model. 
Instead, for the annual reporting periods ending on or after 
                                                
	  
	  
76 Bird, supra note 31, at 237. 
77 Id. at 246-53. 
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June 30, 1996, Listing Rule 4.10.3 required Australian 
companies merely to disclose their corporate governance 
practices.78 The (then) Appendix 4A to this Listing Rule set 
out a non-exhaustive list of corporate governance matters 
that such companies could consider as part of their 
disclosure obligations.79 But as commentators pointed out 
soon after the promulgation of this indicative list, it seemed 
to encourage ambivalent disclosure by failing to clearly 
distinguish between IDs and NEDs or between non-
executive and independent chairs.80 The direct impact of the 
                                                
	  
	  
78 “The rationale for the rule,” according to Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program Paper No. 3, “was that it would result in the release of 
more information of greater relevance to the market compared with a 
rule requiring specific corporate governance practices to be adopted by 
all listed companies.” Commonwealth Treasury, Directors’ Duties and 
Corporate Governance, 3 PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 1, 62 (1997). 
79 See ASX Listing Rules, Guidance Note 9, ASX (2014), 
http://www.asx.com.au/documents/rules/gn09_disclosure_corporate_
governance_practices.pdf (under Disclosure of Corporate Governance 
Practices, previously Appendix 4A to the Listing Rules) [hereinafter 
Appendix 4A]. 
80 Appendix 4A (entitled “List of corporate governance matters”) 
referred expressly only to NEDs. Analyzing disclosures by a sample of 
100 each of large-, medium-, and small-sized ASX companies, Ian 
Ramsey & Richard Hoad, Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices by 
Australian Listed Companies, 15 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 454, 460 (1997), 
noted that  
  60 per cent of the companies surveyed stated 
that their boards contain a majority of [NEDs]. A 
further 7 per cent state that their boards contain a 
majority of [IDs]; whilst 13 per cent state that their 
boards contain a majority of executive directors, and 6 
per cent that there is an equal number of executive 
and [NEDs]. The figures for the different 
capitalization groupings indicate that larger 
companies are more likely to have a majority of NEDs, 
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new ASX disclosure appears to have been limited, although 
corporate governance practice by the early 1990s had 
witnessed an increase in NEDs, and by the late 1990s, larger 
listed companies were tending to appoint significantly more 
IDs as well as NEDs.81 
Australia was then hit by another wave of corporate 
collapses, in some ways worse than the corporate failures of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
and smaller companies are more likely to have a 
majority of executive directors. 
 A recent empirical study of the composition of 
the boards of directors of the largest Australian 
companies found that 40 per cent of the largest 100 
companies have a majority of independent NEDs on 
their boards. Yet in the present study, only 16 per cent 
of the largest companies actually stated that this was 
the case in their corporate governance statements. 
This indicates that companies are not clearly 
addressing this issue in their corporate governance 
statements. In fact, the ASX indicative list of corporate 
governance matters in Appendix 4A refers only to 
[NEDs] and not [IDs]. 
(citation omitted). See also Stapledon & Lawrence, supra note 45. 
This study also noted that 14% of surveyed companies 
(including 6% of large companies) did not discuss board composition in 
their corporate governance statements. Ramsey & Hoad, supra at 467 
(Table A). The study concluded that there was “clearly substantial scope 
for improvement in disclosure of corporate governance practices” both 
generally and with respect to NEDs and IDs. Id. at 465. 
81 Bosch, supra note 46; see also, e.g., Kiel & Nicholson, supra note 45; 
Helen Kang, Mandy Cheng, & Sidney J. Gray, Corporate Governance and 
Board Composition: Diversity and Independence of Australian Boards, 15 
CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 194 (2007); Ingrid Bonn, Toru 
Yoshikawa, & Phillip H. Phan, Effects of Board Structure on Firm 
Performance: A Comparison Between Japan and Australia, 3 ASIAN BUS. & 
MGMT. 105, 117 (2004) (noting that for 104 largest manufacturing 
companies in 1998, average board size was 7.36, including 75% NEDs). 
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the late 1980s. The corporate failures from 2001 were more 
obviously driven by poor corporate governance and 
inadequate regulation,82 as opposed to general downturns in 
the share market and the economy.  
One such dramatic failure involved One.Tel, a newer 
telecom company, which collapsed in May of 2001. News 
Limited and PBL were large blockholders, with Lachlan 
Murdoch and James Packer (respectively heirs to those large 
family-controlled companies) appointed NEDs of One.Tel.83 
Both Murdoch and Packer claimed they were “profoundly 
misled”84 by executives regarding the company’s true 
financial position, even though PBL and News Limited 
executives were regularly briefed on One.Tel85 and Packer 
was substantially involved in its everyday business. 
Curiously, in evidence to the court, both Packer and 
Murdoch suffered from serious memory lapses.86 The 
corporate regulator (ASIC) did not bring proceedings 
against these NEDs, but only the non-executive chair and 
three other executive directors – two of whom accepted 
settlements. The NSW Supreme Court ultimately exonerated 
                                                
	  
	  
82 See generally FRANK L. CLARKE ET AL., CORPORATE COLLAPSE: 
ACCOUNTING, REGULATORY, AND ETHICAL FAILURE (2d ed. 2007). 
83 See generally PAUL BARRY, RICH KIDS (2003). 
84 See, e.g., Elizabeth Knight, You’ve Come a Long Way Since the One.Tel 
Days, Packer, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/youve-come-a-long-way-since-the-
onetel-days-packer-20140414-36nog.html. 
85 See, e.g., A. Lampe, One.Tel kept PBL Briefed, Court Told, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD 25 (Oct. 5, 2005). 
86 See Vanda Carson, Packer Man Blanks Out Pivotal 3 Weeks, THE 
AUSTRALIAN 21 (Oct. 7, 2005) (noting that these dramatic memory losses 
extended to PBL’s CFO, Geoff Kleeman, described as “PBL’s eyes and 
ears” at One Tel). 
2016 THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN AUSTRALIA 609 
 
the other two directors.87 Packer and Murdoch later settled 
their long-running disputes with One.Tel’s creditors by 
paying them $40 million.88 
Another spectacular collapse was HIH, then 
Australia’s second largest insurer. It owed 
 
debts of about $5.3 billion, which Ray Williams 
and his cohorts achieved through gross 
mismanagement, largely charging too little for 
premiums and failing to put away enough to 
pay out claims. They concealed this by under-
reserving (which boosts profits) and using 
“financial reinsurance” contracts to turn losses 
into gains. Williams, the chief executive, 
distracted the investment community with a 
string of takeovers, culminating in paying $300 
million for Rodney Adler's FAI Insurances in 
1998.89  
 
The biggest corporate failure in Australian history led 
to a Royal Commission, chaired by Justice Neville Owen, 
which cost $40 million and published its report in April of 
                                                
	  
	  
87 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v. Rich [2009] 75 ACSR 
1 (Austl.); see also Hill, supra note 21, at 20-24.  
88 Packer, Murdoch Stump Up $40m for One.Tel, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-
business/packer-murdoch-stump-up-40m-for-onetel-20140417-
36ulb.html.  
89 See Margot Saville, HIH: The Inside Story of Australia's Biggest Corporate 
Collapse, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 15, 2003), 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/14/1047583693489.html 
(reviewing M. WESTFIELD, HIH: THE INSIDE STORY OF AUSTRALIA’S 
BIGGEST CORPORATE COLLAPSE (2003)). 
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2003 after an eighteen-month Inquiry. As well as 
highlighting HIH’s corporate governance failures and 
recommending various improvements, the report led to 
ASIC bringing civil and criminal proceedings, which were 
largely successful against Williams and others.90 Justice 
Owen nevertheless expressed reservations about IDs as a 
governance panacea: 
 
The weight of current opinion is that it is 
desirable to have a majority of independent 
directors on a public company board. The 
board of HIH had several ‘independent’ 
directors but this provided little protection 
against the folly of management. I am not 
convinced that a mandatory requirement for 
boards to have a majority of non-executive 
directors is either necessary or desirable. In 
most cases it will be desirable (assuming the 
non-executive directors are truly independent) 
but flexibility ought to be maintained to enable 
corporations to be structured in a way that best 
suits their circumstances. Nonetheless, the 
trend in the prescription of codes of conduct 
seems to assume the premise. My 
recommendations have been developed 
accordingly.91 
 
                                                
	  
	  
90 See Hill, supra note 19; see also the case study summary by Aoun in the 
present paper’s Appendix (also, unfootnoted, 
http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2015/02/guest_blog_hih.html). 
91 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO 
THE FAILURE OF HIH INSURANCE, FINAL REPORT 112, para. 6.2.6 (2003). 
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Justice Owen also doubted “why a substantial 
shareholding in the company should be regarded as 
compromising independence. Such a shareholding, [he 
maintained] may provide greater incentive to bring the 
interests of the company to bear.”92 One problem in the HIH 
debacle was that executives did not pass on sufficient 
information to the board. Another issue highlighted by the 
Owen Report was the lack of auditor independence 
(accounting firm, Andersen, had also provided other 
services to HIH), and insufficient independence on the 
company’s audit committee set up to appoint them 
(including former Anderson partners). Legislation was later 
passed strengthening auditor independence, albeit not to the 
levels witnessed in the U.S. following the Enron debacle.93 
A third and rather different corporate scandal also 
broke around the same time as HIH’s collapse. James Hardie 
Industries Ltd. was the holding company for two 
subsidiaries that had manufactured and sold asbestos in 
Australia until 1987. In 2001, its board approved a proposal 
to essentially move to the Netherlands, leaving behind the 
subsidiaries and establishing a foundation in Australia to 
manage growing asbestos claims. The board minutes also 
recorded that directors approved a draft announcement to 
the ASX (made the next day) that the foundation was “fully-
funded” to meet future legitimate claims. By October of 
2003, however, the foundation had to declare a huge funding 
shortfall. A public Inquiry chaired by David Jackson QC 
commenced in February and reported in September of 
                                                
	  
	  
92 Id. 
93 Nottage, supra note 14 (under “Disclosure,” with further references). 
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2004,94 leading to the James Hardie group reaching a 
settlement with the NSW government in 2005. The regulator 
also sued James Hardie officers, the CEO/director, and 
NEDs for breach of the statutory duty of care, ending (albeit 
in 2012) with a significant victory in the High Court of 
Australia in ASIC v. Hellicar.95  
 
B.   THE ASX’S ‘IF NOT, WHY NOT’ DISCLOSURE REGIME 
SINCE 2003 
 
In March of 2003, arguably to pre-empt more 
extensive legislative intervention, the ASX also unveiled the 
First Edition of its Corporate Governance Principles (in effect 
for its listed companies’ first financial year after July 1, 2003). 
These principles generally adopted a U.K.-style “if not, why 
not” approach,96 especially as it relates to the 
                                                
	  
	  
94 NEW SOUTH WALES SPECIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE MEDICAL 
RESEARCH AND COMPENSATION FOUNDATION, REPORT (Sept. 2004), 
http://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0020/11387/01Part
A.pdf.  
95 Shafron v. Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] 247 
CLR 465 (Austl.); see Hill, supra note 21, at 11-20 (comparing Australian 
and Japanese government responses to asbestos issues); see also Joel 
Rheuben, Government Liability for Regulatory Failure in the Fukushima 
Disaster: An Australian Comparison, in ASIA-PACIFIC DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT: COMPARATIVE AND SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 101 (Simon 
Butt, et al. eds., 2014); see also Nottage, supra note 14 (discussing duties of 
care owed by directors and certain officers under the Corporations Act 
and general law). 
96 However, the Chair of the ASX Corporate Governance Council (since 
November 2011) suggested that the Australian “if not, why not” 
approach may be somewhat less directive than the U.K. “comply or 
explain” approach, which he saw as instead implicating a presumption 
that companies will comply with the recommendations. Alan Cameron, 
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recommendation that the audit committee be comprised of 
all NEDs and a majority of IDs. However, for (larger) 
companies on the S&P/ASX All Ordinaries index, the ASX 
also adopted a new Listing Rule (presently Rule 12.7) 
mandating such an audit committee without exception.97 
Recommendation 2.1 of the ASX Principles also required all 
listed companies to have a majority of IDs on an “if not, why 
not” basis, and it largely adopted the criteria for 
independence first outlined in the Bosch Report.98  
The Principles included general comments somewhat 
reminiscent of statements in Justice Owen’s Report and the 
Hilmer Report as to the need for boards to retain 
appropriate diversity: 
 
What constitutes good corporate governance 
will evolve with the changing circumstances of 
a company and must be tailored to meet those 
circumstances. Best practice must also evolve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
How Do Directors Sleep at Night?, in DIRECTORS IN TROUBLED TIMES 115, 
118 (R. Austin & A. Bilski eds. 2009). 
97 Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations: First Edition, ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 
Recommendations 4.2 and 4.3 (Mar. 2003) [hereinafter ASX First]; but cf. 
infra Part VI (discussing the possibility anyway of “waivers” being given 
by the ASX). 
98 Id. Recommendation 2.2 added that the chair should be an ID, with 
Recommendation 2.3 splitting the roles of chair and CEO. PLESSIS et al., 
supra note 1. Part 4.4.2 also notes parallels between the Principles’ criteria 
for IDs and those set out in the Investment and Financial Services 
Association (IFSA, now the Financial Services Council) “Blue Book” 
(Guidance Note No 2:00: Corporate Governance: A Guide for Fund Managers 
and Corporations, Dec. 2002); and that the U.K. Higgs Report (released in 
Jan. 2003) had for the first time defined IDs in great detail. 
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with developments both in Australia and 
overseas. 
There is no single model of good 
corporate governance. This document 
articulates 10 core principles that the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council [formed in 
2012] believes underlie good corporate 
governance. Each principle is explained in 
detail, with implementation guidance in the 
form of best practice recommendations. 
Although the Council’s 
recommendations are not mandatory and 
cannot, in themselves, prevent corporate 
failures or mistakes in corporate decision-
making, they can provide a reference point for 
enhanced structures to minimize problems and 
optimize performance and accountability.99 
 
A similar approach was taken in the Second Edition 
of the ASX Principles adopted in August of 2007 (in effect 
from 2008).100 As explained further in Part IV, the Second 
                                                
	  
	  
99 ASX First, supra note 96, at 3 (emphasis added). 
100 Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations: Second Edition, 
ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 4 (Aug. 2007) [hereinafter ASX 
Second] (largely repeating the paragraph above, although instead 
mentioning more succinctly that the recommendations are “a reference 
point for companies about their corporate governance structures and 
practices.” They also repeat the view in the First Edition that “Corporate 
governance influences how the objectives of the company are set and 
achieved, how risk is monitored and assessed, and how performance is 
optimized. Effective corporate governance structures encourage 
companies to create value, through entrepreneurialism, innovation, 
development and exploration, and provide accountability and control 
systems commensurate with the risks involved.”). However, the Second 
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Edition made relatively minor changes overall and with 
respect to ID requirements.101 These Principles reiterated 
that: 
 
The Recommendations are not prescriptions, 
they are guidelines, designed to produce an 
outcome that is effective and of high quality 
and integrity. This document does not require 
a “one size fits all” approach to corporate 
governance. Instead, it states suggestions for 
practices designed to optimise corporate 
performance and accountability in the interests 
of shareholders and the broader economy. If a 
company considers that a Recommendation is 
inappropriate to its particular circumstances, it 
has the flexibility not to adopt it — a flexibility 
tempered by the requirement to explain why 
— the “if not, why not” approach.102 
 
Analyses by the ASX from 2004-2007 found that just 
under half of the listed firms complied with 
Recommendation 2.1 (a majority of IDs on boards), although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Edition, quoting from the HIH Report, elaborates the definition of 
“corporate governance” as being “‘the framework of rules, relationships, 
systems and processes within and by which authority is exercised and 
controlled in corporations.’” Id. at 3. 
101 Id. at Recommendations 2.1-2.3. 
102 Id. at 5. Largely repeating the First Edition, with footnote 2 noting, 
however, the mandatory audit committee requirement still for larger 
ASX companies. Id. at 5 n.2. The Third Edition tones down this message, 
although still mentioning that they constitute a disclosed-based regime 
that allows for flexibility. ASX Third, supra note 32, at 5. 
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larger companies reported higher compliance.103 Another 
ambiguous development for IDs in 2004 was the National 
Australia Bank’s boardroom brawl that erupted following a 
foreign exchange trading scandal. One ID, Catherine Walter, 
challenged the board’s decision to commission an 
investigative report by PwC, citing alleged conflicts of 
interest. Following the intervention of institutional investors, 
a compromise was reached: Walter and others involved in 
the dispute resigned.104 This led to mixed reactions: some 
supported Walter’s independent approach, whereas others 
warned of the risks of fragmenting boards. Some companies 
considered introducing “prenuptial agreements” for NEDs 
that would allow the board to review their “performance” 
every two years and remove them if their performance was 
deemed unsatisfactory. ASIC and some commentators 
declared that this would contravene the shareholders’ non-
derogable right to remove directors of public companies 
pursuant to Section 203E of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 
                                                
	  
	  
103 Anelgo Veljanovski, Albie Brooks, & Judy Oliver, Independent Directors 
and Australia’s Corporate Governance Model: A Survey of Independent 
Directors’ Views, 24 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 33, 40 (2009) (curiously, the cited 
ASX Principles compliance reports no longer appear to be available 
online). For 2010, see Analysis of Corporate Governance Disclosures in 
Annual Reports for year ended 30 June 2010, ASX (2010), 
http://203.170.82.73/~firstgro/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/corporate-governance-disclosures-in-FY10-
annual-reports.pdf. 
104 Ultimately, the fallout from this scandal led to the resignation of six 
NEDs and the Chairman, Graeme Kraehe, as part of a “board renewal” 
process. See Peter Ryan, Ex NAB Board Member Catherine Walter Speaks 
Out, ABC AM (Sept. 1, 2004), 
www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s1189565.htm. 
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which then caused (some) companies to water down such 
agreements with directors.105 
 
C.   POST-GFC RE-REGULATION: BOARD DIVERSITY AND 
EXECUTIVE PAY 
 
By mid-2008, the GFC had reached Australia’s shores, 
but its impact was far less severe than most other major 
world economies.106 Despite the collapses of smaller and 
mid-tier firms, as well as the near-collapse of Centro (a large 
property developer) as early as December of 2007, major 
financial institutions did not implode.107 Australia’s relative 
success in weathering the GFC was largely due to a natural 
resources boom108 as well as the economic resilience of 
China, which has been Australia’s largest trading partner 
                                                
	  
	  
105 Hill, supra note 21, at 30-38. However, the ASIC regularly issues 
reminders opposing this practice of director “pre-nuptial agreements,” 
emphasizing that directors are ultimately accountable to shareholders. 
See, e.g., Media Release, 04-40 Removal of Directors of Public Companies, 
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION (Aug. 17, 2004). It 
may be that directors forced to resign do not kick up a fuss because they 
are keen to avoid reputational damage (as do directors caring about their 
reputations generally). See especially Ronald W. Masulis & Shawn Mobbs, 
Independent Director Incentives: Where do Talented Directors Spend their 
Limited Time and Energy?, 111 J. OF FIN. ECON. 406 (2014). 
106 Hill, supra note 21. 
107 Such as the “non-bank,” Allco, which collapsed in 2008. See Paul 
Barry, Coe. & Co., THE MONTHLY (May 2010), 
www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2010/april/1273118974/paul-
barry/coe-co; on Centro, see Hill, supra note 20. 
108 See generally ROSS GARNAUT, DOG DAYS: AUSTRALIA AFTER THE BOOM 7 
(2013). 
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since 2007.109 Other significant factors arguably include: 
differences in Australia’s monetary and fiscal stimulus 
policy in response to the GFC; its “twin peaks” financial 
market regulation – centered on ASIC for business conduct 
regulation; the role played by Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) established in 1998 and 
significantly reformed following the 2003 HIH Royal 
Commission; Australia’s unique banking history (including 
four very large and profitable banks that are not permitted 
to merge); and compulsory superannuation.110 Interestingly, 
one of the reforms to APRA (agreed on in 2003) involved 
replacing its non-executive board with an executive group 
made up of a full-time CEO and 203 Commissioners.111 With 
respect to banks and other regulated financial institutions, 
APRA essentially requires adherence to ASX criteria for 
director and committee independence, albeit without the 
leeway of an “if not, why not” approach.112 
The major focus of post-GFC policy-makers in 
Australia has been executive pay. This is due to concerns 
over rising remuneration levels and the possibility of 
misaligned incentives that may encourage excessive 
                                                
	  
	  
109 David Uren, China Emerges as Our Biggest Trade Partner, THE 
AUSTRALIAN (May 5, 2007), 
www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/china-emerges-as-our-
biggest-trade-partner/story-e6frg6nf-1111113474544. 
110 Hill, supra note 21. 
111 Id. at 41. 
112 Fischer & Swan, supra note 25, at 2 (citing Prudential Standard 
CPS510). This requirement has been in place since 2006 in Prudential 
Standard APS 510. See, e.g., Ann-Marie Moodie, Government Report Raises 
Dilemma Over Meaning of ‘Independent’, THE AUSTL. FIN. REV. (June 5, 
2014) (discussing Commonwealth of Australia, Better Regulation and 
Governance, Enhanced Transparency and Imposed Competition in 
Superannuation, Discussion Paper (Nov. 28, 2013)). 
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managerial risk-taking. Since July of 2010, APRA has 
required a Capital Board Remuneration Committee with a 
majority of IDs, an ID chair, and a charter to set suitable 
remuneration policies for all Australian banks and insurance 
companies.113 In March of 2009, the government 
commissioned a broader inquiry by the Productivity 
Commission, which published a draft report in September 
and a final report in December of 2009.114 Many of its 
recommendations focused on better disclosure of 
remuneration, but the most controversial was a “two strikes 
and re-election resolution” proposal. Under legislation 
introduced in December of 2010, which passed in June of 
2011: 
 
•   if 25% or more shareholders voted at an AGM against 
the remuneration report (the “first strike”), the board 
                                                
	  
	  
113 John H. Farrar, The Global Financial Crisis and the Governance of 
Financial Institutions, 24 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 227, 239-40 (2010) (noting that 
these changes take as their starting point the Financial Stability Board’s 
Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (Apr., 2009) adopted by the 
G20 leaders). See also Discussion Paper: Remuneration – Proposed Extensions 
to Governance Requirements for APRA-regulated Institutions, AUSTRALIAN 
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY (May 2009), 
www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/Consultations/Documents/AI_DP_P
EGR_052009_ex_R.pdf; Shane Magee & Elizabeth Sheedy, Governance of 
Financial Institutions: A Cross-Country Evaluation of National Codes 
Following Basel (2010), MACQUIRE UNIVERSITY (Nov. 5, 2013), 
http://www.mafc.mq.edu.au/linkservid/1540C6CD-BD86-F895-
5B2ABD243C81C155/showMeta/0/ (finding that Australia ranks highly 
on implementing such board independence requirements under its 
banking regulation, but is only middling among eleven countries 
compared for consistency with Basel Committee recommendations). 
114 Executive Remuneration in Australia, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, 
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA (2009), 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/executive-remuneration. 
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would have to explain how their concerns were being 
addressed in the following year’s report;  
•   if 25% or more voted against the remuneration report 
at the next AGM (the “second strike”), the 
shareholders would have to also vote to determine 
whether directors who had voted at the board in 
favor of the second report would need to stand for re-
election (albeit with some exceptions); 
•   at the separate “spill meeting,” to be held within 90 
days, those directors would lose their positions if 
voted against by 50% or more of the shareholders. 
 
Bodies such as the AICD and major law firms voiced 
concerns about the new legislative scheme, which went well 
beyond the purely advisory shareholder vote on 
remuneration enacted in 2004.115 One study found that 104 
listed companies received a first strike in 2011, and 105 
companies in 2012 (including twenty-two which received a 
second strike), but also noted some positive effect of the new 
rule on the executive pay-performance link (suggesting 
better incentive alignment).116 Although key executives (or 
their closely related parties) whose remuneration may be 
disclosed in the remuneration report and who hold shares in 
the company may not vote on the remuneration and spill 
resolutions, it seems they may vote to reappoint the board. 
Thus, at Crown Limited’s AGM in 2011:  
                                                
	  
	  
115 Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van der Elst, Say on Pay Around the 
World, 14-10 VAND. L. & ECON. RES. PAPER 20-21 (2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2401761; Nottage, 
supra note 15. 
116 Reeza Monem & Chew Ng, Australia’s ‘Two-Strikes’ Rule and the Pay-
Performance Link: Are Shareholders Judicious?, 9 J. OF CONTEMP. ACCT. & 
ECON. 237, 238 (2013). 
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After shareholders voted against Crown’s 
remuneration report, James Packer (Crown 
casino executive chairman and 46% 
shareholder) is reported to have told 
shareholders that in the event that 
shareholders vote against the remuneration 
report again in 2012, triggering the two-strikes 
rule and resulting in a board spill, he “will use 
[his] votes [as 46% shareholder] to ensure all 
directors are voted back in immediately.”117 
 
The government also asked CAMAC to investigate 
executive remuneration reporting and arrangements, but it 
reported only in April of 2011.118 Neither governmental 
                                                
	  
	  
117 Claire Macmillan, Impact of regulatory reforms on executive remuneration 
in Australia – AGMs in 2011, KEEPING GOOD COMPANIES 100, 102 (Mar. 
2012) (adding that “it appears that the ‘no’ vote was born of shareholder 
concerns about Crown’s disclosure standards for remuneration, rather 
than the amount or manner in which executives were to be paid. For 
example, a representative of Perpetual (who did not vote against the 
report on the basis that Mr Packer does not take a salary), reportedly 
Crown’s largest shareholder after Mr Packer, commented that ‘this is an 
issue of disclosure ... the vote should result in the company increasing its 
disclosure around these issues.’ The Australian Shareholders’ 
Association reportedly considered that Crown’s executive remuneration 
was not excessive. Rather, its concerns went to the lack of transparency 
in Crown’s incentive plan because specific performance hurdles, their 
weightings and executives’ performance were not disclosed.” (citations 
omitted)). 
118 Executive Remuneration, CORPORATION AND MARKETS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byheadline/pdffinal+rep
orts+2011/$file/executive_remuneration_report_april11.pdf. 
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report considered the possible implications of Australia 
retaining a comparatively strong blockholder tradition in 
listed companies, or whether IDs were better equipped to 
control remuneration arrangements.  
In April of 2010, the ASX responded to growing 
concerns about executive pay by releasing an exposure draft 
of further proposed amendments to its Corporate Governance 
Principles, including those relating to remuneration and 
board diversity; it also revised its Listing Rules. 
Amendments to the Principles in 2010 (in effect from the 
2011 financial year) clarified the roles of the remuneration 
committee but reaffirmed its long-held recommendation 
(since the 2003 Principles) that an ID should chair the 
remuneration committee, which should have a majority of 
IDs, and at least three directors. A new Listing Rule (12.8, in 
effect from 2012) further mandated that an entity listed in 
the S&P/ASX 300 Index at the beginning of its financial year 
should have a remuneration committee comprised solely of 
NEDs (like the audit committee) for the entire duration of 
that financial year.119  
In addition, the 2010 amendments to the ASX 
Principles introduced new disclosure requirements 
concerning board diversity, prompted particularly by 
concerns over a persistent lack of women directors in listed 
companies.120 In September of 2008, the newly elected Rudd 
Government requested that CAMAC inquire into board 
diversity. Its Report in March of 2009 included (more 
limited) recommendations for the ASX Principles. The 
                                                
	  
	  
119 Macmillan, supra note 116, at 100-101 (also suggesting amendments 
along these lines). 
120 Etheridge, supra note 40, at 35-36 (finding that diversity had 
diminished somewhat over 2004-2007). 
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CAMAC Report noted that the proportion of women 
directors in the ASX 200 companies had remained around 
8% since 2002, with those in executive management around 
11-12% from 2004-2008 (and only half in line management, 
which is considered a valuable precursor to board 
appointments).121  
Interestingly, this Report, as well as the original terms 
of reference from the Government and especially the 
amended ASX Principles,122 suggest a possible positive link 
between enhanced board diversity and corporate 
performance. However, researchers such as Douglas 
Branson have pointed out that most studies have found no 
or even some negative effect on overall corporate 
performance. Instead, he summarizes the more commonly 
advanced arguments in favor of appointing women on 
boards as follows: helping to avoid “groupthink” and 
corporate collapses, providing a positive role model for 
women employees, positive signaling for consumers, better 
functionality in an increasingly diverse world, and 
                                                
	  
	  
121 Diversity on Boards of Directors, CORPORATION AND MARKETS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT 26-28 (Mar. 2009), 
www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byheadline/pdffinal+reports+20
09/$file/board_diversity_b5.pdf. In Australia’s largest 100 companies in 
1995, women held 3.6% of 889 board seats, with most (29 out of 32 seats) 
held by women in non-executive positions. Stapledon & Lawrence, supra 
note 45, at 186. 
122 ASX Third, supra note 32, at 11 (asserting, “Research has shown that 
increased gender diversity on boards is associated with better financial 
performance.”) Footnote 17 cites two studies showing this from 2011. Id. 
at 11 n.17. ASX Third also adds that “promotion of gender diversity can 
broaden the pool for recruitment of high quality employees, enhance 
employee retention, foster a closer connection with and better 
understanding of customers, and improve corporate image and 
reputation.” Id. at 11. 
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alignment with developments in international and domestic 
anti-discrimination law.123 Reduced emphasis on the 
groupthink-focused argument124 may be related to Australia 
escaping the GFC with comparatively few corporate 
collapses. Less understandable though is the lack of linkage 
in the recent discourse between this broader topic of board 
diversity and the arguably related question of IDs, including 
longstanding debates even in Australia about whether IDs 
truly help to prevent corporate failures or to enhance 
business performance (as mentioned in Parts II and V).125  
Further discussion about IDs (and NEDs more 
generally) surfaces sporadically throughout a third 
significant report emerging soon after the GFC in CAMAC: 
Guidance for Directors (April of 2010). In August of 2009, the 
Government sought CAMAC’s views on whether and how 
Australia might benefit from more guidance to both 
executive directors and NEDs in light of guidance or codes 
of conduct available to directors abroad, such as the U.K.’s 
Higgs Report (2003) and revised Corporate Governance 
Code. After detailing various official and non-official 
                                                
	  
	  
123 Douglas Branson, An Australian Perspective on a Global Phenomenon: 
Initiatives to Place Women on Corporate Boards of Directors, 27 AUSTL. J. OF 
CORP. L. 2, 4-5 (2012). 
124 But see Vijaya Nagarajan, Regulating for Women on Corporate Boards: 
Polycentric Governance in Australia, 39 FED. L. REV. 255, 257-62 (2011), 
carefully assessing, in a leading Australian law journal, four main 
reasons for having more women on boards: improved decision-making 
(and avoiding groupthink), better profitability, a more democratic 
representation of social diversity, and enhanced corporate image for 
employees, consumers and shareholders. See also Wheeler, supra note 24 
(noting recent theoretical and empirical literature questioning aspects of 
the original “groupthink” problem). 
125 Exceptionally, but briefly, see Le Mire & Gilligan, supra note 24, at 
463-64.  
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sources of guidance available in Australia, the U.K., North 
America, and internationally (especially the OECD and Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision), the CAMAC Advisory 
Committee concluded that it did “not see a need for the 
development of a new code of conduct or best practice 
guidance by a regulator,” but that (inter alia) it would be 
“timely for the ASX Corporate Governance Council to 
review its principles and recommendations in light of 
international developments.”126 CAMAC also noted that: 
“The overriding responsibility of directors is to act in the 
best interests of the company. This can be a difficult and 
demanding task. It includes, but goes beyond, an 
understanding of compliance and other legal issues. First 
and foremost, it requires directors to focus on the business of 
the company and direct it towards success.”127 It then 
argued that directors should not become “subject to 
licensing or other requirements that could be employed to 
administer or enforce a mandatory code or best practice 
principles,”128 (although APRA did enforce these criteria for 
its regulated financial institutions). CAMAC further argued 
that, in general: 
 
There are dangers too in moving to a more 
prescriptive approach that attempts to codify 
the large volume of existing regulation. It 
could result in inflexibility or complexity or a 
focus on formal compliance rather than in 
                                                
	  
	  
126 Guidance for Directors, CORPORATIONS AND MARKETS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT 73 (Apr., 2010), 
www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byheadline/pdffinal+reports+20
10/$file/guidance_for_directors_report_april2010.pdf. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 79. 
626 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
helping to bring about substantive 
improvements in governance practices and 
behaviour. It could also have the effect of 
imposing new or enhancing obligatory 
standards on directors in complying with their 
current statutory and common law duties and 
responsibilities. Furthermore, it may give the 
misleading impression that particular matters 
are more settled, or less open to further 
development, than may in fact be the case.129 
 
From 2012-2013, the ASX Council duly reviewed its 
Principles and commenced a public consultation on a Third 
Edition, which was finalized in March of 2014.130 This new 
edition added recommendations to establish a risk 
committee (either standalone or as part of an audit 
committee, also needing a majority of IDs) or otherwise to 
disclose the company’s risk management practices, and to 
disclose whether and how it regards economic, 
environmental, and social sustainability risks. It slightly 
amended the diversity-related recommendations (such as for 
those with disabilities) and elevated some practices or 
disclosures hitherto mentioned in the Commentary on the 
Principles into actual Recommendations (triggering the “if 
not, why not” disclosure obligations), while allowing several 
more flexible alternatives for smaller listed companies. The 
Third Edition also made minor amendments to the 
provisions on IDs, as explained next in Part IV. For example, 
                                                
	  
	  
129 Id. at 80. 
130 See ASX Third, supra note 32 (consultation documents and public 
submissions can be found at: www.asx.com.au/regulation/corporate-
governance-council/review-and-submissions.htm). 
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the Commentary on “close family ties” as indicia of a lack of 
independence was elevated into “the Box.” Throughout the 
Council’s consultation paper, references were made and 
comparisons were drawn:  
 
to the corporate governance codes operating 
elsewhere, including those in the UK, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, South Africa, Canada, 
NYSE’s Corporate Governance Rules, and the 
International Corporate Governance 
Network’s Global Corporate Governance 
Guidelines (Revised 2009). These codes were 
chosen on the basis that they apply to major 
and comparable markets to the Australian 
market and are written in English.131 
 
Other differences from the earlier editions include: 
bringing the (somewhat confusing) reporting 
recommendations into the substantive recommendations 
themselves; rewriting some of the general commentary to 
give it more of a “directive” tone; and the significant 
expansion in footnote references. 
 
D.   DEVELOPING CASE LAW ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES 
 
The recent changes at the ASX have occurred against 
the backdrop of various government reviews and some 
legislative enactments, as well as some significant 
developments in Australian case law. On the one hand, the 
Jackson Inquiry Report (2004) agreed with James Hardie that 
                                                
	  
	  
131 Id. (citations omitted). 
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due to principles of limited liability and separate legal 
personality, it was not required to contribute to the 
foundation’s funding shortfall for asbestos claims. But the 
Jackson Inquiry Report identified such principles as needing 
review in light of contemporary community expectations. 
That Inquiry also prompted two governmental reports that 
considered whether the existing law required directors and 
officers to only protect the interests of shareholders (i.e. not 
other stakeholders). Reports from CAMAC132 and a 
Parliamentary Joint Committee133 found that Australian 
corporate law permits a broader stakeholder perspective, 
notwithstanding the scant case law (especially as a 
corporation approaches or becomes insolvent). As a result, 
they did not recommend legislative reform along the lines of 
Section 176 of the U.K. Companies Act 2006.134 
On the other hand, case law regarding duties of care 
and diligence owed by directors has grown significantly 
since 1993, with ASIC enjoying a high success rate in its 
enforcement proceedings.135 Admittedly, in ASIC v. Rich 
(decided on November 18, 2009),136 the (executive) directors 
of One.Tel were protected by the statutory business 
judgment rule – although, unlike in the U.S., the defendants 
                                                
	  
	  
132Available  at 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/ReportsFina
l+Reports+Home?openDocument (Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee). 
133Availableat 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/C
orporations_and_Financial_Services (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services). 
134 Hill, supra note 21, at 33-42. 
135 Greg Golding, Tightening the Screws on Directors: Care, Delegation, and 
Reliance, 35 U. N.S.W. L. J. 266 (2012).  
136 ASIC v. Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1 (Austl.). 
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had the burden of proving that its preconditions were 
satisfied – in relation to managerial conduct such as business 
planning and budgeting. Notwithstanding ASIC’s defeat 
here, Austin J. agreed with the regulator’s argument that the 
definition in Section 180(3) would not protect directors 
violating their duties to monitor or oversee management. 
In ASIC v. Macdonald (No. 11) (decided on April 23, 
2009), the business judgment rule was not pleaded because 
James Hardie’s directors and officers denied affirmatively 
approving the draft announcement on funding asbestos 
claims, which was made the following day to the ASX. Gzell 
J. considered but then rejected a delegation defense, holding 
that: “Management having brought the matter to the board, 
none of them was entitled to abdicate responsibility by 
delegating his or her duty to a fellow director.”137 His Honor 
concluded that the NEDs as well as the executives had 
breached the statutory duty of care because they knew or 
should have known that such unequivocal public statements 
could result in legal liability, harm to the company’s 
reputation, and market backlash. This judgment was later 
reversed by the NSW Court of Appeal, but primarily based 
on a different view of the facts before the trial judge (as to 
whether the board had in fact seen and approved the draft 
announcement). In the subsequent appeal to the High Court 
of Australia, ASIC v. Hellicar,138 the High Court reversed the 
Court of Appeal decision, ultimately affirming the primary 
judge’s findings. This case, writes Hill, represents: 
                                                
	  
	  
137 ASIC v. Macdonald (2009) (No. 11) 256 ALR 199, 260 (Austl.). 
138 ASIC v. Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 (Austl.) (reversing Morely v. ASIC 
(2010) 247 ALR 205 (Austl.)). For a deeper critique, however, see Harry 
Glasbeek, The James Hardie directors: A case of missing directors and 
misdirection’s by law, 28 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 107 (2013). 
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a major victory for ASIC and other 
government regulators, as well as a cautionary 
tale for directors. The James Hardie litigation as 
a whole represents a watershed in Australian 
corporate law. Previously, Australian 
corporate law, like its US counterpart, tended 
to maintain a clear divide between conduct 
and decision rules, particularly in relation to 
non-executive directors. Although the leading 
decision on directors’ duty of care and 
diligence, the mid-1990s case of Daniels v 
Anderson contained strong dicta about the 
responsibilities of all directors, ultimately 
these aspirational statements were not 
matched by liability for non-executive 
directors.139 
 
In the Federal Court of Australia’s decision in ASIC v. 
Healey (decided on June 27, 2011), both executives and NEDs 
of Centro were found to have breached their statutory duty 
of care and diligence by, for example, approving Centro’s 
financial statements that erroneously classified $2 billion of 
current liabilities as non-current.140 This breach was found 
even though (a) Middleton J. found the directors “intelligent, 
experienced and contentious people,”141 (b) an audit 
                                                
	  
	  
139 Hill, supra note 21, at 19 (citing Brian Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, 
Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2006) (on 
U.S. law) and Daniels v. Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438 (Austl.)). 
140 ASIC v. Healey & Ors (No. 2) (2011) 196 FCR 430 (Austl.). 
141 Id. at para. 8. 
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committee existed (with IDs), and (c) there had been 
auditing reports from a major accounting firm.  
The Commentary on Recommendation 2.6 (on 
induction for new directors and professional development 
opportunities) for the Third Edition of the ASX Principles 
(2014) cites ASIC v. Healey to urge companies to provide the 
necessary resources for directors to develop a sufficient 
understanding of accounting matters in order to properly 
discharge their minimum duties regarding its financial 
statement literacy. 
 
In ASIC v Healey . . . the Federal Court held 
that it is the duty of every director of an entity 
subject to section 344 of the Corporations Act . 
. . to read the financial statements of the entity 
carefully and to consider whether what they 
disclose is consistent with the director’s own 
knowledge of the entity’s affairs. It is 
important that a listed entity’s board have a 
diverse range of skills and experience and this 
necessarily means that not all directors will 
have the same level of accounting skills and 
experience. Nevertheless, it is in the interests 
of a listed entity and its security holders (and 
also in the personal interests of the director 
concerned) that each director of the entity has 
an appropriate base level of understanding of 
accounting matters.142 
 
ASIC v. Healey is the only judgment cited in these 
Principles, although the current edition adds several 
                                                
	  
	  
142 ASX Third, supra note 32, at 26 n.22. 
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footnote references to statutory provisions and ASX Listing 
Rules (and even some other material) compared to the two 
earlier editions. 
 
IV. DEFINING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
 
Unlike in the United States (e.g. Sarbanes Oxley Act 
2002), there are no legislative prescriptions concerning board 
composition and definition of independence in Australia. 
Instead, soft law instruments such as the ASX CGP prop up 
the Australian regulatory framework. As mentioned above 
in Part III, the emergence of IDs as a centerpiece of 
Australian corporate governance practices traces its roots to 
these ASX initiatives, especially around 2003, when it first 
introduced Principles and Recommendations on an “if not, 
why not” basis. The First and Second Editions (2007) are 
very similar, but the Third Edition (2014) contains significant 
modifications. 
Recommendation 2.1 in the First and Second Editions 
requires a majority of the board to be IDs. The Commentary 
views IDs as separate from management and any business or 
other relationship that could “materially interfere with – or 
could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with” – 
the exercise of their independent judgment.143 Because the 
Commentary (especially in the Second Edition) also 
highlights that all directors should bring an independent 
judgment to bear on board decisions, and because separation 
from management is a characteristic shared by all NEDs, the 
distinguishing feature of IDs logically must be matters that 
                                                
	  
	  
143 The First Edition of the Principles adds a reference to “unfettered and 
independent judgment.” ASX First, supra note 96, at 19. 
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(actually or reasonably) “materially interfere” with their 
exercise of independent judgment.144 
Importantly, the Commentary lists in Box 2.1 various 
relationships that “define” a lack of independence 
(according to the First Edition) or that “may affect 
independent status” (according to the Second Edition).145 All 
NEDs should provide any information relevant to their 
independence, with the board then identifying in the annual 
report’s corporate governance statement those directors it 
considers to be IDs. If the board considers those directors 
“independent” notwithstanding the existence of 
relationships listed in Box 2.1, it should provide reasons in 
support of this conclusion. The Second and Third Editions 
state that such relationships should then be disclosed in the 
annual report. Despite the board’s ultimate discretion to 
declare those directors affected by the Box 2.1 relationship 
factors as “independent,” these relationships have had a 
significant impact on corporate practice. In making such 
assessments, the Commentary to both the First and Second 
Editions emphasize the importance of boards evaluating 
“materiality thresholds from the perspective of both the 
company and its directors, and to disclose these.” A footnote 
to that text provides one example.146 
                                                
	  
	  
144 In many ways, this is consistent with the Bosch Committee’s views 
introduced above in Part III.1. 
145 ASX Second, supra note 99, at 16. This also differs slightly from the 
First Edition by adding to the Commentary on Principle 2 that, generally 
(“structure the board to add value”), the board should be structured so 
that it “encourages enhanced performance of the company,” as well as 
exercising independent judgment, reviewing and challenging 
management, and properly understanding and dealing with current and 
emerging business issues. 
146 Id. at 16 n.11 (“For example, a board may decide that affiliation with a 
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The Third Edition omits this specific example of a 
materiality threshold, reordering and rephrasing the 
Recommendations and Commentary, but essentially retains 
the same approach as the earlier editions. Recommendation 
2.3 calls for the company to identify those directors 
adjudged as IDs, and to disclose if and why that assessment 
has been made notwithstanding the existence of a Box 2.3 
factor. It also requires disclosure of “the length of service of 
each director.”147 The “materiality” of the relationship is still 
mentioned, but in the Box itself (detailing the list of interests 
of relationships that “might cause doubts” about a director’s 
independence), rather than in the Commentary itself. The 
assessment depends on the extent of interference with the 
director’s capacity for exercising independent judgment 
“and to act in the best interests of the entity and its security 
holders generally.”148 The Commentary also talks about IDs 
not being “allied with the interests management, a 
substantial security holder or other relevant stakeholder,” 
and cautions how this “appellation . . . gives great comfort to 
security holders and [is] not one that should be applied 
lightly.”149 Table 3 summarizes the relevant considerations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
business which accounts for, say, less than X% of the company’s revenue 
is, as a category, immaterial for the purpose of determining 
independence. If the company discloses the standard it follows and 
makes a general statement that the relevant director meets that standard, 
investors are better informed about the board’s reasoning.”). 
147 ASX Third, supra note 32, at 16; ACSI 2013, supra note 42 (finding that 
the average (and median) tenure of NEDs, which is significantly higher 
for men than women, increased for ASX 100 companies from 5.6 in 2011 
to 5.8 years in 2012 (median 4.7), as well as for ASX 101-200 companies). 
148 Id. at 16 (Box 2.3). 
149 Id. at 16. The Commentary adds a duty on candidates for directorships 
– seemingly not just for NED positions – to “disclose to the company all 
relationships or interests that may bear on independence,” which in turn 
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that may compromise a director’s independence, thus calling 
for board assessment.  
 
Table 3: Changes in ASX Principles and Recommendations 
Regarding IDs 
 
First Edition 
(2003) Box 2.1150 
Second Edition 
(2007) Box 2.1 
Third Edition 
(2014) Box 2.3 
1. substantial 
shareholder of 
the company or 
an officer of, or 
otherwise 
associated 
directly with, a 
substantial 
shareholder of 
the company 
1. [same as the first 
edition] 
1. [similar to the 
2nd edition, but 
omits being 
‘directly’ associated 
with ‘security 
holder’, rather 
than ‘shareholder’] 
2. within the last 
three years has 
been employed 
in an executive 
capacity by the 
company or 
another group 
member, or been 
a director after 
2. [essentially the 
same: ‘is 
employed, or has 
previously been 
employed in an 
executive capacity 
by the company or 
another group 
member, and there 
2. [very similar, 
but refers to the 
company’s ‘child 
entities’ rather 
than a ‘group 
member’] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
should be disclosed to shareholders in materials for board elections. Id. 
at 17. 
150 Only the First Edition lists these relationships in the negative, defining 
an ID to be an NED (“not a member of management”), which is not a 
substantial shareholder, an employee, etc. ASX First, supra note 96, at 20. 
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ceasing to hold 
such employment 
has not been a 
period of at least 
three years 
between 
ceasing such 
employment and 
serving on the 
board’] 
3. has within the 
last three years 
been a principal 
of a material 
professional 
adviser or a 
material 
consultant to the 
company or 
another group 
member, or an 
employee 
materially 
associated with 
the service 
provided 
3. [same] 
 
3. [similar, but 
refers to “partner, 
director or senior 
employee of a 
provider of 
material 
professional 
services to the 
entity or any of its 
child entities”]. 
4. is a material 
supplier or 
customer of the 
company or 
other group 
member, or an 
officer of 
or otherwise 
associated 
directly or 
4. [same] 4. [quite similar, 
but adds having 
“been within the 
last three years” in a 
“material business 
relationship (e.g. 
as a supplier or 
customer”] 
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indirectly with a 
material supplier 
or customer 
 
5. has a material 
contractual 
relationship with 
the company or 
another group 
member other 
than as a director 
of the company 
5. [same] 
 
5. [very similar, 
but refers to the 
company’s “child 
entities” rather 
than a “group 
member”] 
6. has served on 
the board for a 
period which 
could, or could 
reasonably be 
perceived to, 
materially 
interfere with the 
director’s ability to 
act in the best 
interests of the 
company 
 6. has been a director 
of the entity for such 
a period that his or 
her independence 
may have been 
compromised 
7. is free of any 
interest and any 
business or other 
relationship which 
could, or could 
reasonably be 
perceived to, 
materially 
interfere with the 
director’s ability to 
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act in the best 
interests of the 
company 
  7. has close family 
ties with any 
person who falls 
within any of the 
categories 
described above 
 
This comparative analysis (with different editions’ 
provisions italicized for emphasis) demonstrates strong 
similarities over time, but the Third Edition reflects 
tightened criteria.151 That is particularly evident with respect 
to associations with professional services providers and 
business partners of the company. The Third Edition also 
incorporates “close family ties” into the Box. This is yet 
another example of a relationship that “might cause doubts” 
about the director’s independence, thus triggering the 
disclosure and reporting obligations discussed above. The 
earlier editions merely set out Commentary that: “Family 
ties and cross-directorships may be relevant in considering 
interests and relationships which affect independence, and 
should be disclosed by directors to the board.”152 The 
elevation of “family ties” in the Third Edition into the Box, 
however, appears qualified. A careful reading reveals that 
                                                
	  
	  
151  For a broader comparison of changes in the Corporate Governances 
Council’s Recommendations from the Second Edition to the Third 
Edition, see Translation Table Corporate Governance Council 
Recommendations (New to Old), ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, 
http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/translation-table-
2014-cgc-recommendations.pdf.  
152 Restated in ASX Second, supra note 99, at 17. 
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the Third Edition only refers to “close” family ties. More 
curiously it is silent on any reference to potential problems 
with cross-directorships.153 Arguably, such relationships 
may be captured by the catch-all definition in the 
Commentary (although the Box itself has not included such 
a catch-all since the First Edition(see item 7 in Table 3 
above). 
A broad reference to directors’ tenure, conspicuously 
absent from the Second Edition, resurfaces in the Third 
Edition. In contradistinction to the First Edition, it is 
reworded to focus on its possible detrimental impact on 
independence. The Commentary to the First Edition 
mentions that: “The UK Higgs Report nominates 10 years in 
relation to director tenure considerations, but [this] has not 
yet been adopted in the UK. The Council will continue to 
monitor developments in other jurisdictions in this area.”154 
The 2013 ASX Corporate Governance Council’s public 
Consultation Paper for the Third Edition noted, “Tenure was 
subsequently dropped from Box 2.1 in the 2nd edition”155 
(without elaboration), but that subsequently, “the UK, 
Singapore, South Africa and Hong Kong codes have all been 
amended to recommend that there should be a rigorous 
review of the independence of those directors who have 
served more than 9 years.”156  
                                                
	  
	  
153 Cf., e.g., Moncrieff, supra note 52, and Part VII infra, including Kiel & 
Nicholson, supra note 45, and Etheridge, supra note 40, on interlocks. 
154 ASX Second, supra note 99, at 21. 
155 ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS: CONSULTATION PAPER 
11 (Aug. 16, 2013), www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/cgc-
3rd-edition-consultation-paper.pdf. 
156 Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted) (e.g., to the Singapore Code Guideline 
2.4 [maximum of 9 years] and Hong Kong Code Provision A.4.3 [9 
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This controversial “9-year” tenure was featured in an 
early draft of the Third Edition, but the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council did not adopt this proposal. The 
Council was evidently aware of the controversy this was 
likely to engender as the accompanying review tentatively 
suggested the 9-year service period as a possible 
“indicator,”157 militating against independence. The Third 
Edition now refers to a director serving “for such a period 
that his or her independence may be compromised,”158 with 
the Commentary explaining that:  
 
the Council recognises that the interests of a 
listed entity and its security holders are likely 
to be well served by having a mix of directors, 
some with a longer tenure with a deep 
understanding of the entity and its business 
and some with a shorter tenure with fresh 
ideas and perspective. It also recognises that 
the chair of the board will frequently fall into 
the former category rather than the latter. 
The mere fact that a director has served 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
years]); Thomas Ritchie, Independent directors: Magic Bullet or Band-Aid?, 
BOND U. CORP. GOV. E JOURNAL 6 (2007), 
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&co
ntext=cgej (remarking that the ASX’s Consultation Paper in 2006 had 
suggested that length of service should be viewed as an issue relating to 
succession, not independence of the board. Ritchie also notes that U.S. 
and European models around that time, the first edition of the ASX 
Principles were also distinctive in having a catch-all provision and 
stricter criteria regarding employment with a company consultant, but 
looser criteria regarding being an employee in that only those working 
“in an executive capacity” may lack independence.). 
157 ASX Third, supra note 32, at 2 [9]. 
158 Id. at 16, Box 2.3. 
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on a board for a substantial period does not 
mean that he or she has become too close to 
management to be considered independent. 
However, the board should regularly assess 
whether that might be the case for any director 
who has served in that in that position for 
more than 10 years.159 
 
This compromise may well be in response to the stiff 
opposition from directorial lobbies and other interest 
groups. For instance, the AICD, which has long opposed the 
ASX’s indicative list of factors informing the question of 
directorial independence, is particularly critical of the re-
emergence of tenure as a factor that might inform the 
question of directorial independence. In its submission to the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council, the AICD rejected this 
move and was scathing of any references to “arbitrary time 
limits.” The submission also warned that the ASX’s 
approach here “fails to acknowledge the benefits” of long-
serving directors, such as: continuity of organization-specific 
knowledge (of greater importance in complex industries), 
greater board stability, and improved board dynamics and 
collegiality.160 
Although it is tempting (and too convenient) to 
characterize this concession as a panicky capitulation to the 
                                                
	  
	  
159 Id. at 17. 
160 Submission on Revised Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF COMPANY DIRECTORS 6-7 
(Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.companydirectors.com.au/~/media/Resources/Director%
20Resource%20Centre/Policy%20on%20director%20issues/2013/AICD
%20%20submission%20on%20revised%20Corporate%20Governance%20
Principles%20and%20Recommendations.ashx. 
642 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
strong resistance by director lobbies and other vested 
interests, there may be more at stake here. In fact, the status 
quo may reflect efforts to accommodate the significant 
increase in ID numbers brought about by the ASX corporate 
governance initiatives since 2003. Put another way, the 
ASX’s backing down may also be tacit acknowledgment of 
the lack of supply of appropriately qualified directors. Of 
course, these reforms, and the stark reality of a (supposedly) 
thin director labor supply market, combine to generate a 
large group of incumbents – a group that includes a 
significant cohort of “professional IDs” – who may not wish 
for their independence to be so rigorously assessed with 
respect to length of tenure (see Part II above). 
Interestingly, in the subsequent main AGM season in 
2014, major proxy voting advisory firms continued to 
highlight the problems associated with lengthy ID tenure. 
For example, ISS recommended that after twelve or more 
years, a director could be classed as no longer independent. 
Together with CGI Glass Lewis, it also opposed the re-
election of Rowena Danziger to the Crown Resorts board, 
arguing she was a “non-independent director on a board 
that is non-majority independent,” because she was a 
seventeen-year veteran of Packer family-dominated 
company boards and a family friend. Concerns also went 
beyond major family-dominated companies (such as Ramsay 
Health Care and Harvey Norman). Both proxy advisory 
firms also recommended against re-electing Peter Warne to 
the board of ASX, which he had sat on along with its merged 
entity, Sydney Futures Exchange, for twenty-four years.161 
                                                
	  
	  
161 Georgia Wilkins, It’s AGM Season and Directors are in the Cross-Hairs as 
Shareholders Chase Answers, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 8 (Sept. 27, 2014). 
Ulysses Chioatta, governance expert and former head of ISS, maintains 
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They were concerned also about “overboarding” (holding 
too many directorships) both generally and in this particular 
case. Warne sat on the boards of two other major listed 
companies, and chaired boards in two more – with each 
chairmanship considered by CGI as equivalent to two 
regular board memberships. According to CGI, holding 
more than five directorships is undesirable “overboarding,” 
and this becomes particularly troublesome during sudden 
increases in corporate activity (e.g. a takeover attempt).162 
Next we discuss how the “substantial shareholder” 
relationship can potentially compromise independence. 
While this is mentioned in all three editions of the ASX 
Principles (as in the original Bosch Report of 1991), the Third 
Edition no longer includes a footnote cross-reference to the 
definition in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (5%).163 It also 
adds the following new Commentary:  
 
In relation to the fourth example in Box 2.3 
(being or being an associate of a substantial 
security holder), the holding of securities in 
the entity may help to align the interests of a 
director with those of other security holders, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
that directors with a “no” vote “over 10% is a vote of no confidence” and 
it’s a “huge reputation blow. Most directors always get re-elected with 
95% plus.” 
162 Stephen Letts, Shareholder Activists Target Long-serving and Over-
committed Directors, ABC NEWS (Oct. 19, 2014), 
www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-17/shareholder-activists-target-long-
serving-directors/5821122.  
163 Cf. e.g., ASX Second, supra note 99, at 13 n.13, referring to section 9 of 
the Corporations Act (still otherwise applicable and defining “substantial 
holding” as 5% or more of the total number of votes attached to voting 
shares). 
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and such holdings are therefore not 
discouraged. The example simply reflects that 
a director holding or representing a substantial 
stake in the entity is likely to be seen as having 
a different interest to security holders with 
smaller stakes.164 
The Council here appears mindful of critiques from 
financial economists, such as Professor Peter Swan, who 
argue that the “if not, why not” approach of the ASX 
Principles towards requiring a majority of IDs has caused a 
decline in corporate performance.165 Swan, a long-time 
trenchant critic of the ASX Corporate Governances 
Principles on ID “requirements,” is especially critical of the 
5% “substantial shareholder” (or their associates) “rule” 
(discussed further in Part V). These criticisms, it seems, have 
served as a catalyst for ACSI’s first collation of director 
shareholdings in ASX-listed companies. That study reports 
that 11.5% of NEDs of ASX 100 companies had “no skin in 
the game” (no shares in the companies they govern), which 
is described as a “concerning statistic.”166 
A final subtle difference in the Third Edition is that it 
no longer footnotes the fact that its Box factors have been 
“adapted” from the definition given in guidance for fund 
managers (and others) from their peak body in Australia, the 
so-called “Blue Book” developed by the Investment and 
Financial Services Association (IFSA).167 IFSA is now called 
the Financial Services Council, and still promotes a Blue 
                                                
	  
	  
164 ASX Third, supra note 32, at 17. 
165 Fischer & Swan, supra note 25.  
166 ACSI 2012, supra note 38, at 3 (33-5. 21% of ASX 101-200 NEDs had no 
shares). 
167 See, e.g., ASX Second, supra note 99, at 17 n.12.  
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Book. Its definition for IDs bears close parallels to the 
current ASX Principles.168 Investors may also wish to 
consider the guidance offered by another major peak 
association, ACSI, which has recently outlined indicia 
(reproduced in Table 4) for assessing independence (albeit 
on a “case-by-case basis”).  
                                                
	  
	  
168 Cf. Corporate Governance: A Guide for Fund Managers and Corporations, 
INV. & FIN. SERVS. ASSOC. 18 (2009), 
http://www.fsc.org.au/downloads/file/IFSAGuidanceNotes/2GN_2_
Corporate_Governance_2009.pdf (referring to being associated “directly 
or indirectly” with a substantial shareholder, or having been an 
“employee,” not even a “senior employee,” of a material professional 
adviser or consultant to the company). This Blue Book also highlights 
potential issues in holding multiple directorships, although not focused 
solely on IDs and without recommending a precise maximum number. 
Commentary on Recommendation 2.1 of the Third Edition ASX 
Principles requiring a remuneration committee requires it to review time 
required from NEDs, who must make disclosures before accepting other 
directorships requiring significant time commitments. ASX Third, supra 
note 32, at 15. 
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Table 4: ASCI’s Criteria for Determining Independence 169
 
 
                                                
	  
	  
169 ACSI Governance Guidelines: A Guide for Superannuation Funds to 
Monitor Listed Australian Companies, ACSI 15 (July 19, 2013), 
http://acsi.org.au/images/stories/ACSIDocuments/2013%20ACSI%20
Guidelines.pdf. 
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On their face, the ACSI criteria are more detailed and 
stringent than the ASX factors. Length of tenure, however, is 
not specified. Nevertheless, in ACSI’s 2013 board 
composition survey, 20+ years seems to be used as one 
threshold for determining whether directors are “affiliated,” 
as opposed to being independent.170 That study went on to 
explain that this was: 
 
based on the classification by ACSI of 
directors, which can differ from that of the 
company. For example, Woodside in its 2012 
annual report classifies as independent former 
Shell executive Christopher Haynes, who 
retired in 2011, despite Shell owning 23% of 
the company’s shares and having nominated 
Haynes to the board. ACSI classified Haynes 
as affiliated. These cases illustrate that the ASX 
Council’s guidelines on assessing director 
independence, unlike the rules of foreign stock 
exchanges such as the NYSE, allow for 
considerable exercise of judgement by 
company boards when assessing director 
independence.171 
 
                                                
	  
	  
170 ACSI 2013, supra note 42, at 9-12 (“Prior to 2005, ACSI classified all 
directors with more than nine years’ service on a board as affiliated and 
from 2005 only those directors who had spent more than 20 years on a 
board were considered affiliated (the change in definition was effective 
from the second edition of the ACSI Guidelines, released in 2005).”). 
171 Id. at 11 (citation omitted). 
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V. ASSESSING THE IMPACT AND ROLES OF IDS IN AUSTRALIA 
 
How effective has the gradual increase in IDs on 
listed company boards in Australia (especially in larger 
companies post-2003) been? When the ASX initially 
proposed a mandatory requirement (in 1992), and then a 
U.K.-style comply-or-explain regime (in 1994), many 
commentators queried whether IDs would make much 
difference in practice. The ambiguous U.S. empirical 
evidence concerning the impact of IDs on overall corporate 
performance was also highlighted.172 The ASX later 
compromised by introducing a more relaxed disclosure 
regime in 1996, as outlined in Part III above. Naturally, it 
took several years for Australia-specific empirical research 
on IDs to emerge.  
 
A.   ECONOMETRIC STUDIES OF NED OR ID IMPACT ON 
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Quantitative studies investigating the (in)efficacy of 
IDs have produced ambivalent results. Table 5 below sets 
out a selective assortment of econometric studies 
investigating the impact of IDs on corporate performance in 
Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: ID Impact on Corporate Performance 
                                                
	  
	  
172 Bird, supra note 31, at 255-8. 
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Study Sample size 
(and year) 
Definition of 
directors 
Firm 
Performance 
Impact 
Muth & 
Donaldson 
(1998) 
largest 145 
from 550 
sampled from 
1173 listed 
ASX 
companies 
(1992) 
Composite 
“board 
independence”173 
1993-4 negative for 
composite 
shareholder 
wealth (ROA 
and ROE) and 
sales growth 
Lawrence 
& 
Stapledon 
(1999) 
ASX 100 
(1995) 
IDs (as per 
AIMA / IFSA in 
1997) 
1985-1995 nil 
Cotter et 
al. (2003) 
ASX 200 
(1997) 
IDs (as per 
AIMA) 
1997 nil 
Kiel & 
Nicholson 
(2003) 
348 from ASX 
500 (1996, 
excluding 
banks and 
mining firms) 
NEDs 1996-98 
(averages) 
positive for 
Tobin’s Q but 
negative for 
ROA 
Hutchison 
(2002) 
229 from ASX 
500 (1998) 
NEDs  negative174 
Matolcsy 
et al. 
306 from 
sample of 
Outside NEDs 
(including “gray 
1999-2001 positive for 
composite 
                                                
	  
	  
173 Proportion of NEDs; interest alignment (relationships with executives, 
suppliers etc., significant shareholders, family members & founders); 
CEO duality; board size; average age. 
174 Marion Hutchinson, An Analysis of the Association Between Firms’ 
Investment Opportunities, Board Composition and Firm Performance, 9 ASIA-
PACIFIC J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 17 (2002) (analyzing 229 ASX 500 firms in 
1998). Hutchinson also found that growth firms tend to have executive 
boards but that those firms performed better with more NEDs.  
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(2004) largest 507 
companies 
(2001) 
directors” with 
“potential links 
to the managers 
… such as 
bankers or 
lawyers”) 
Market Value 
but only for 
firms with 
above-average 
“growth 
options” 
(market to 
book value) 
Bonn et al. 
(2004) 
104 
manufacturing 
firms from the 
top 500 
companies 
(1998) 
NEDs 1999 positive only 
for ROA 
(contrasting 
Japan: nil for 
Market to 
Book value) 
Setja-
Atmaja 
(2009) 
316 from ASX 
(1998, 
excluding 
banks) 
IDs (but not as 
per ASX 
Principles 2003) 
2000-05 positive for 
closely-held 
firms, and 
overall (with 
greater impact 
for closely-
held firms or 
those paying 
low 
dividends)175 
Pham et 
al. (2012) 
136 largest 
ASX 
(excluding 
NEDs (not 
current or former 
employees, or 
1994-2003 positive for 
cost of capital 
                                                
	  
	  
175 Closely-held companies were defined as those with a shareholder 
with more than 20% ownership. They preferred fewer IDs and 
underperformed widely-held companies, suggesting “rent extraction” 
from the larger shareholder(s). See also Kang et al., supra note 83, and 
Pham et al., supra note 48, at 90. 
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financial and 
utility 
companies) 
related by family 
to executive 
directors or with 
business 
dealings)  
Fischer & 
Swan 
(2013) 
ASX 500 
(2001-11, so 
969 distinct 
firms) 
 2001-11 negative (and 
other effects 
summarized 
below) 
Swan & 
Forsberg 
(2014) 
ASX 200 
(2002-12), so 
430 distinct 
firms 
 2002-12 negative (and 
other effects 
summarized 
below) 
 
Generally speaking, the evidence supporting the 
proposition that IDs are responsible for improvements in 
overall corporate performance or value is not strong. 
However, there are various methodological difficulties with 
these studies, including: 
•   Some studies only focus on NEDs, while others 
distinguish between IDs and NEDs, albeit with 
varying definitions; 
•   The time periods and sample sizes for firms are 
generally limited, thus impacting on robustness of the 
results; 
•   Studies often do not refer to earlier research, perhaps 
because they were published too close together or 
simply overlooked, often resulting in different control 
variables exacerbating difficulties in comparing 
studies; 
•   All such econometric studies also have serious 
limitations regarding measurement of key variables 
(including measures of corporate performance, such 
as Return on Assets or ROA, as the dependent 
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variable),176 and especially endogeneity between the 
independent and dependent variables (including the 
extent of IDs). 
 
Such endogeneity is particularly troublesome because 
companies that do poorly tend to appoint more IDs (and 
vice versa). To test for causation under such circumstances, 
ideally we need a mandatory rule change that forces all 
companies (good and bad performers) to adopt IDs. The 
ASX Principles and Listing Rules, as outlined above (Part II), 
instead leave scope for board and company discretion (at 
least regarding the “majority of IDs” requirement). Even 
though Listing Rules have for some time mandated IDs for 
audit committees (since 2004) and remuneration committees 
(since 2011) for certain listed companies, designing a 
convincing econometric study that assesses board 
independence here is proving particularly difficult. 
Consequently, none have been published in Australia.177 
This endogeneity problem remains serious for the 
large-scale econometric study of ASX listed company 
performance publicized in 2013 under the leadership of 
Professor Peter Swan.178 The fact that the introduction of the 
                                                
	  
	  
176 Tobin Q, for example, is a theoretical concept that needs to be 
approximated. It assumes that current market prices are an effective 
measure of corporate value – a proposition that became much more 
contestable after the GFC, although the allure of the associated “efficient 
markets hypothesis” remains remarkably strong. Cf. JOHN QUIGGIN, 
ZOMBIE ECONOMICS: HOW DEAD IDEAS STILL WALK AMONG US (2010) 
(critiquing the idea). 
177 We thank Professor Ron Masulis (Professor Swan’s colleague at 
UNSW) for the helpful discussion (June 6, 2014) regarding these 
methodological issues. 
178 Gavin Smith, Peter L. Swan, & David R. Gallagher, Institutional 
Investor Monitoring and the Structure of Corporate Boards, (Oct. 2, 2007) 
2016 THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN AUSTRALIA 653 
 
2003 ASX Principles constituted only a “quasi-natural 
experiment” lessens without completely destroying the 
impact of his controversial key conclusions: 
 
majority board independence reduces firm 
performance regardless of whether the 
criterion is shareholder value in terms of the 
Tobin’s Q or Market-to-Book ratios, or 
accounting performance as measured by the 
industry-adjusted ROA. We also find that 
boards once they become dominated by 
independent directors are far poorer at 
replacing a relatively under-performing CEO, 
pay poorly performing CEOs significantly 
more, and take home significantly higher 
director fees . . . We estimate the dollar cost of 
these treatment effects over the period 2003-
2011 conservatively at AUS $69 billion, making 
it one of the most costly and disastrous 
regulatory changes ever implemented in 
Australia by a private regulator.179 
 
The study by Swan, which was particularly critical of 
the ASX Principles’ view that independence could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
(unpublished paper), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=939441 (curiously 
noting that institutional influence was negatively related to board size 
and positively related to board independence, with institutions working 
to remove inside directors (thus increasing the proportion of NEDs and 
IDs) if firms performed badly). 
179 Fischer & Swan, supra note 25, at 9. This estimated “cost” however, 
should be contextualized in light of the ASX’s current market 
capitalization of around $1.5 trillion. 
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compromised by associations with a major shareholder, has 
attracted largely unfavorable responses.180 Initially, on 
August 28, 2013, the politically conservative, Murdoch 
family-owned newspaper, The Australian, reported that: 
 
Simon Marais, chief investment officer at fund 
manager Allan Gray, was unsurprised by the 
findings and considered the existing rule 
“ridiculous”. He said: “The best director is 
someone who has as much money at stake as 
possible in the company.” 
“What is important,” Professor Swan 
added, “is independence from management, 
not from the owners.” Over the nine-year 
period, total chief executive pay roughly 
doubled to $2.2 million at the companies that 
enacted more “independent” boards, and non-
executive director fees were almost $45,000 a 
year higher.  
“If you owe your position to the CEO 
would you be hard on him?” Mr. Marais said. 
Professor Swan blamed the “ludicrous” 
rule for contributing to a “catalogue of 
corporate disasters”, citing Fairfax, Qantas and 
Rio Tinto in particular. “Rio has 14-odd 
directors sitting in London all divorced from 
the reality of the Australian business,” he said.  
“When the stock price plummets due to 
poor monitoring, a director with negligible 
shareholding feels less pain than does a 
substantial shareholder.” Mr. Marais decried 
                                                
	  
	  
180 Cf. Austin, supra note 26. 
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the inertia and lack of investor discipline 
applied to local boards. “It's often like the old 
Soviet elections when investors have a choice 
of six candidates for six positions,” he said. 
The share of independent directors at 
top 200 companies has jumped from less than 
10 per cent in 2002 to about 60 per cent today. 
“They solved the 'principle agent problem' by 
destroying the principle,” Professor Swan 
quipped, alluding to the theory that explains 
why managers (the agent) of a firm are able to 
profit at the expense of the owners (the 
principle). 
Ian Ramsay, professor of corporate 
governance at Melbourne University, said 
skills, expertise and experience were more 
relevant criteria than “independence” per se.  
But he said there was “no simple 
answer”, suggesting the existing rules were in 
any case guidelines and did not need to be 
changed: “The quality of decisions of directors 
with substantial wealth tied up in the 
company may also not be in a company’s best 
interests.” Under the auspices of improving 
corporate governance, stock exchanges in the 
US and Europe began in the early 2000s 
insisting that listed firms had boards with a 
majority of independent directors, following 
the high-profile collapses of US giants Enron 
and WorldCom. 
“It's amazing regulators cite these 
examples as justification for independent 
directors when those companies in fact had 
majority independent directors,” said 
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Professor Swan, who said the ASX deserved 
credit for making the independent director 
rule optional. 
An ASX spokeswoman said it 
continually reviewed its rules and was open to 
improvements.181 
 
The next day, however, the same reporter presented 
more negative reactions to Swan’s study: 
 
The Australian Institute of Company Directors 
and the ASX said yesterday “compositional 
factors” made it very difficult to reach UNSW 
finance professor Peter Swan's conclusion that 
ASX-listed companies that had boards with a 
majority of independent directors had 
destroyed $70 billion in shareholder value and 
overseen a doubling of chief executive pay. 
Kevin Lewis, the head of compliance at 
the ASX, said the number of successful small 
mining firms in the past decade, which were 
typically too small to have independent 
directors, would probably distort any such 
study.  
                                                
	  
	  
181 Adam Creighton, Shareholders Suffer as Independent Directors Pay Fat 
Cats, THE AUSTRALIAN 19 (Aug. 28, 2013), 
www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/shareholders-suffer-
as-independent-directors-pay-fat-cats/story-fn91v9q3-1226705307903#; 
see also, Serkan Honeine & Peter L. Swan, Is Company Performance 
Dependent on Outside Director ‘Skin in the Game’?, (2010) (unpublished 
paper) (finding a significant positive relationship between NED 
ownership and firm performance, especially during the GFC where 
endogeneity effects might arguably be less). 
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“And the big four banks didn't do well 
during the period of the GFC, and they had 
boards with a majority of independent 
directors,” he said.  
“Peter Swan's view of corporate 
governance appears to be a long way away 
from global best practice,” he added, citing 
rules mandating “independent” boards in US 
and European jurisdictions and pointing out 
that the ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
which includes shareholder groups, 
recommended the 2003 guidance which led to 
more boards with independent directors. 
Steven Burrell, a spokesman for the 
[Australian Institute of Company Directors], 
said bigger companies were more likely to 
have independent boards and bigger firms 
inevitably paid their directors and 
management more.  
“Obviously independence is not the be-
all and end-all of corporate governance; 
directors with skin in the game are clearly 
desirable, but we support the status quo,” he 
said.  
“Directors with a large shareholding in a 
company can compromise the interests of small 
shareholders,” he said, pouring cold water on 
the argument that more directorial “skin in the 
game” promotes better decisions. 
Andrew Jackson, head of research at 
Vinva fund management, said: “The current 
level of ownership by independent directors in 
Australia is very low. For instance, directors 
own less than 0.10 per cent of the company for 
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the majority of ASX300 stocks -- which is a bit 
disappointing.  
“All else equal, we would prefer that 
independent directors have skin in the game 
via a material direct holding in the company 
they direct.”182 
 
The italicized comments by Burrell above are apposite 
in light of Australia’s “blockholder” legacy.183 An early and 
small-scale econometric study by Setja-Atmaja found a 
positive impact from IDs on closely-held companies or those 
paying low dividends (a policy that may favor blockholders, 
because they can extract value in other ways).184 
Putting aside the question of how IDs might help 
mitigate agency costs between large and dispersed 
shareholders, recent studies have investigated the supposed 
                                                
	  
	  
182 Adam Creighton, ASX, Directors Dispute Claims Execs to Blame, THE 
AUSTRALIAN 27 (Aug. 29, 2013) (emphasis added). However, the 
following week Creighton returned to a familiar tune, that is, decrying 
the growth of independent directors on Australian boards and 
advocating, much like Professor Swan, for a “costless change in 
regulation” by removing the requirement that IDs remain unconnected 
through the 5%+ shareholding criterion. In so doing, he described 
Professor Swan as “[o]ne of the few Australian economics professors of 
international standing” and his study as “one of the more remarkable 
academic studies in Australia.” See Adam Creighton, Independent 
Directors a Bad Idea, THE AUSTRALIAN 32 (Sept. 6, 2013). 
183 Robert Baxt et al., Corporate Governance in Australia: The Evolving Legal 
Framework and Empirical Evidence, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN 
ASIAN-PACIFIC CRITIQUE (Low Chee Keong ed., 2002). 
184 Lukas Y. Setia-Atmaja, Governance Mechanisms and Firm Value: The 
Impact of Ownership Concentration and Dividends, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: 
AN INT’L REV. 694 (2009). See generally Nottage, supra note 14 (discussing 
blockholder, as well as the Crown example regarding executive 
remuneration referenced above in Part III).  
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wealth destruction caused by majority independent boards 
in Australia. In contrast to the results found by Swan, earlier 
Australian studies – despite their limitations – indicate 
neutral or even some positive effects associated with the 
growth of IDs (see Table 5 above). A recent study by Swan’s 
colleague at the UNSW School of Business, Professor Ron 
Masulis, also found a significant positive impact of 
monitoring of CEOs (turnover), after the 2002 SOX 
legislation in the U.S. mandated all IDs for audit 
committees.185 In addition, recent meta-studies from around 
the globe tend to find no significant effects from IDs on 
overall corporate performance,186 in contradistinction to the 
overwhelming negative effects found for Australia by 
Swan.187 Moreover, earlier work by Swan had acknowledged 
                                                
	  
	  
185 Lixiong Guo & Ronald Masulis, Board Structure and Monitoring: New 
Evidence from CEO Turnovers, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2770 (2015), 
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/28/10/2770.full.pdf+html. 
186 See Margret Blair, Making The Hard Call: The Unheralded Role of 
Corporate Boards of Directors, YOUTUBE (Jan. 30, 2014), 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgwThLU8478 (providing further 
references and arguing that the lack of statistical correlation instead 
supports her “team production theory” of corporate governance). 
187 Interestingly, Professor Swan, a staunch advocate of free market 
principles and a long-time skeptic of mandatory corporate governance 
compliance regimes, has also written in support of “super-voting shares” 
first touted by Rupert Murdoch’s Newscorp. See, e.g., Peter L. Swan & G. 
Garvey, Response to the Australian Stock Exchange’s Discussion Paper on 
Appropriate Voting Rights for Equity Securities, 9 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 158 
(1991) (expressly acknowledging that the underlying study was 
commissioned by News Corporation) and Peter L. Swan, “Why Super 
Shares Can Be Vital Tools in the Creation of Wealth”, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (May 
19, 1994). Though a critic of what he has described as “largely 
uninformed and unmotivated independent directors . . . responsible for 
[$70 billion in] value destruction,” he has offered some qualified support 
for the ASX’s “if not, why not” regulations, if only because the ASX does 
660 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
studies showing that IDs at least “have been shown to 
provide an episodic monitoring function, by benefiting 
shareholders in extraordinary or crisis situations.”188  
Nonetheless, Swan (curiously with a new co-author) 
updated this econometric study with a new data set in late 
2014. Once more, the findings lambast ID “performance” in 
Australian listed companies. He contends that ASX 200 
companies with majority ID-led boards have “destroyed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
not require “complete compliance.” See Peter L. Swan, Boards Must 
Change, THE AUSTRALIAN 23 (Sept. 5, 2013). Professor Swan went as far as 
characterizing the ASX’s definition of IDs as a “communistic desire to 
lock out significant shareholders” from participation in corporate 
management. Elsewhere, Swan again argues this disconnect between 
ownership and control created by ASX ID rules “is the most ludicrous 
rule since capitalism was invented. It’s pure Soviet Union-ism, command 
and control.” See Peter L. Swan, Skin in the Game: Is Board Independence 
Destroying Firm Value?, U. N.S.W., BUS. SCH. (Oct. 13, 2013), 
https://www.businessthink.unsw.edu.au/Pages/Skin-in-the-Game-Is-
Board-Independence-Destroying-Firm-Value.aspx. See also Peter L. 
Swan, The ASX Governance Council and “Independent” Boards, 8 L. & FIN. 
MKT. REV. 196 (2014). Swan’s views appear to be deeply held, and have 
predictably found a sympathetic ear in the newspaper owned by 
Newscorp. See, e.g., Peter L. Swan, Independent Directors Don’t Help 
Investor Cause, THE AUSTRALIAN 28 (Apr. 19, 2011). In that opinion piece, 
Professor Swan launched his crusade against the so-called 5% rule:  
 An independent director is one who is not a substantial 
shareholder owning 5% or more, has not been employed in an executive 
capacity within the last three years, and has not been a principal of a 
material professional adviser or a material consultant to the company 
within the last three years. These characteristics collectively help to 
define ignorance of company affairs and lack of motivation – negligible 
“skin in the game.” Swan went on to mention Lachlan Murdoch and 
how the latter’s then 9% holding in Network 10 disqualified him from 
being an ID. 
188 Smith, supra note 174, at 7. 
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between $30.7 billion and $51.6 billion of shareholder value 
over the period 2002-2012.”189 
Perhaps due to the strong vested interest now among 
incumbent IDs (anecdotally referred to as the “chosen 
ones”),190 as well as peak bodies like the AICD that became 
increasingly involved in training them and promoting their 
interests over the 1990s,191 the ASX Council decided against 
relaxing ID disclosure requirements in its Third Edition 
Principles (Part V). If anything, the requirements were 
slightly tightened. However, Commentary was added about 
the possibility of shareholder links with directors instead 
creating some positive benefits, along with some more 
                                                
	  
	  
189 Swan & Forsberg, supra note 41, at 30. In this latest study, Swan has 
yet again revised downwards the supposed destruction of “shareholder 
value” attributable to majority ID-led board. Cf. Peter L. Swan, 
Submission to Financial System Inquiry, FIN. SYS. INQUIRY (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/04/Swan_Peter.pdf (estimating $85 billion 
over the period 2002–2012). 
190 Cf. PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS AND 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, BETTER SHAREHOLDERS – BETTER COMPANY 
SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN AUSTRALIA, § 4.76 at 
59 (2008), 
www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/shareh
old/report/report.pdf (arguing more generally that “board patronage 
and dominance by an entrenched few is unhealthy for good corporate 
governance” and urging that processes for electing directors in Australia 
could be “substantially improved”). The former Chief Justice of NSW 
publically suggested that institutional investors should promote a list of 
potential professional IDs, picking up a proposal from Professors Gilson 
and Kraakman in the U.S. (originally in 1991, revived in 2009 with 
respect to “the directors’ guild”), however, this idea has not found 
traction in Australia. See James Spigelman, Institutional Shareholders and 
Corporate Governance, 28 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 235, 241 (2010). 
191 See Bosch Report 1991, supra note 28, at 281-82 (also noting the 
emergence of a significant board consulting industry). 
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flexible disclosure provisions, especially for smaller listed 
companies (e.g. regarding audit committees). 
 
B.   OTHER EMPIRICAL RESEARCH INTO IDS IN AUSTRALIA 
 
What about other possible effects from IDs, such as 
reducing the likelihood of corporate collapses? 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to prove such counterfactuals. 
Case study research can be illuminating, but little work has 
been done in Australia. In fact, some prominent corporate 
failures instead undermine this argument. As mentioned 
above (Part III), the failed HIH group was notionally an 
“early adopter” and appeared to have a majority of IDs even 
before the 2003 ASX Principles were introduced; as did the 
Centro group, which almost failed in 2007.192  
Broader qualitative research in Australia has also been 
limited. One study, published in 2008, based on interviews 
of thirty directors (with multiple appointments, including 
twenty-four only with NED positions and five with NED 
and executive director positions), as well as sixteen 
Australian fund manager executives in Australia, reported 
that IDs should have the following qualities: 
 
•   demonstrate independence of mind, information, 
relationships with the company, and income; 
•   be responsible to shareholders; and 
                                                
	  
	  
192 See generally D.F. JACKSON Q.C., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY INTO THE MEDICAL RESEARCH AND COMPENSATION FOUNDATION 
(2d ed. 2004) (the HIH board had 13 directors of whom five were 
executive and eight were NEDs, but some of those were arguably not 
IDs).  
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•   be available, allocating sufficient time for board 
duties, and appointed for a limited time.193 
 
Another survey identified 684 IDs from the top 200 
ASX listed companies in 2006 (an average of 3.4 directors per 
company), but merely secured 143 responses (22.5% 
response rate). Most respondents (85%) had more than five 
years’ experience as an ID and 41% had served on boards for 
over ten years, with 66% also having served on more than 5 
boards over these periods.194 Most (81%) had executive 
experience in one or more companies, and many (61%) 
viewed themselves as “professional directors.”195 
Unfortunately, such “sample bias” somewhat 
undermines the respondents’ views on the appropriate roles 
and features for IDs, and corporate governance generally in 
Australia. It is unsurprising, therefore, that 95% thought that 
IDs strengthen corporate governance. More interestingly, 
questionnaire responses were evenly split on whether 
having IDs would lead to conservative decision-making. 
30% thought there was need for a U.K.-style “senior ID” and 
only 26% thought that international business experience was 
needed to be an effective ID.196 Most (90%) preferred the 
                                                
	  
	  
193 One respondent remarked that IDs “should not remain on the board 
of a particular company for too long . . . we have said ten years is 
ample.” See Margaret McCabe & Margaret Nowak, The Independent 
Director on the Board of Company Directors, 23 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 
545, 558 (2008). 
194 Veljanowski et al., supra note 102, at 44. Regrettably, the authors do 
not mention the average tenure of those directors sitting on the same 
board. 
195 Id. at 44-45. 
196 Id. at 47-49. Cf. Janice How et al., Internationalisation and Corporate 
Governance: Australian Evidence, 6 ASIA PACIFIC J. OF ECON. AND BUS. 42, 42 
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“self-regulatory” approach of the ASX Principles to 
mandatory requirements, especially in light of diverse needs 
of companies, the flexibility of guidelines, and, crucially, 
because independence was dependent on the character or 
state of mind and is something that could be legislated.197 
The respondents generally favored the ASX Principles’ 
indicia of (non-) independence, including not being a 
significant customer or supplier to the company, a 
professional advisor, recent executive, appointment due to a 
personal relationship, or representing a major shareholder.198 
The authors add that:  
 
The only issue upon which the 
respondents differed was whether an effective 
[ID] should not have directorships in common 
with other directors. Only 10.7% agreed with 
the proposition while 42.6% of respondents 
disagreed and 46.7% were undecided. 
However, this finding is consistent with 
respondents’ views on other matters. The 
majority of respondents (65.3%) consider that 
there is a shortage of good people to take on 
the role of an [ID] and 100% of respondents 
agree that [IDs] should not be limited to one 
board. Given these findings whereby multi-
directorships are going to be the norm, then 
common directorships would be expected and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
(2002) (showing that the degree of a firm’s internationalization in 
Australia had a significant impact on the proportion of IDs with 
international experience). 
197 Veljanowski et al. supra note 102, at 45-51. 
198 Id. at 50 (especially Table 6 titled “Qualitative Data on ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles ID Criteria”). 
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difficult to avoid.  
Respondents were asked their opinion 
as to the appropriate tenure period for an [ID]. 
The majority of respondents (69.3%) did not 
agree that board tenure should be limited by a 
prescribed maximum term. In addition, the 
number of boards that an [ID] could sit on at 
any one time also received strong responses. 
All respondents (100%) considered that an [ID] 
should not be limited to only one board and 
only 16% of respondents considered that a full-
time executive should be limited to only one 
board. As to the number of boards that an [ID] 
should be limited to was not as clear cut in the 
responses. Only 28% of respondents 
considered limits should be put in place, but 
when asked if the limit should be no more 
than five boards respondents’ were split with 
only 45.9% in agreement.199 
 
Given such results, it is unsurprising that the Third Edition 
of the ASX Principles make relatively few changes regarding 
IDs (as explained in Part IV). But much more research, 
qualitative and quantitative, could have been and should be 
done in Australia.  
 
VI. WHERE TO NEXT? 
 
                                                
	  
	  
199 Id. at 50. 
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As discussed in Part II.2 above, IDs are now a very 
prominent and entrenched part of the Australian corporate 
landscape. Yet, as outlined in Part V, there remains a 
surprisingly limited empirical foundation behind measures 
that encouraged IDs in Australian listed companies loosely 
from 1996 and more extensively (on an “if not, why not” 
basis) from 2004, as well as mandating IDs on the audit 
committee and now the remuneration committee. There 
remains underlying uncertainty as to the primary roles that 
they (and directors more generally) are expected to play, 
such as corporate value creation versus risk management 
(Parts II.1 and III). Some institutional investor analysts in 
Australia are also privately critical about IDs, suggesting 
that their “mates” often appoint them and that the 
significant financial incentives drawn from multiple board 
appointments lead them “not to rock the boat” (unless a 
capsize is imminent, resulting in serious and obvious 
corporate failure, with the attendant reputational damage). 
Such critics consider “industry experience” as being much 
more important for corporate boards overall (cf. Part V.2 
above).200 
                                                
	  
	  
200 Personal communication from an experienced investment fund 
analyst to Nottage on June 29, 2014, adding that a lawyer or accountant 
ID might still be useful especially for risk management provided the 
other directors had very strong industry experience. On IDs not “rocking 
the boat,” cf. Kathy Fogel et al., Powerful Independent Directors, EUR. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE INST., FINANCE WORKING PAPER NO. 404/2014 (Sept. 2015), 
and the NAB boardroom brawl and its aftermath in 2004 referenced 
above in part III. On problems of holding individual directors to account 
for their decision-making, see PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
CORPORATIONS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 186, §4.73 at 59 
(quoting a proxy advisor: “From the outside, it is a very hard thing for an 
institutional shareholder to work out [whether] ‘Is this individual 
director a great guy [sic] on a board that is a dud?’”). 
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Apart from Peter Swan’s controversial work claiming 
wholesale wealth destruction caused by IDs (Part V.1), few 
other academic studies have seriously questioned the 
received wisdom about IDs. However, doubts were raised in 
passing in 1997 and 2003 (as mentioned in Part I above), and 
more sustained critiques are now emerging in Australia. 
Even before the GFC, in 2007, two professors of accounting 
(Clarke and Dean) strongly criticized the independence 
“dogma”: 
 
Independence continues to be cited as an 
essential objective of reforms relating to 
auditors and directors, when it could equally 
be argued that the expert knowledge required 
in an ever more complex corporate world is 
more likely to be characteristic of those 
immersed in, dependent for their welfare 
upon, the affairs of their corporation. Rigging 
board structures, as some have suggested, to 
comprise half NEDs continues to be a sought 
after ideal, though how part-time directors can 
and will monitor executives’ work effectively 
is yet to be demonstrated. Virtues attributed to 
having audit committees comprising only 
NEDs continue to be promoted, 
notwithstanding the fact that audit committees 
have been in existence for over sixty years, and 
have been features of companies involved in 
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spectacular collapses at, for example, Enron, 
HIH and One.Tel.201 
 
These authors also objected to independence being 
“more often described as the outcome of particular 
circumstances than it is explained.”202 They argued that a 
more productive focus would be on honesty, even though 
this can only be fully determined after the event, whereas 
back-up criteria of (lack of) independence can seemingly be 
monitored ex ante: “A heavy hand has been used to achieve 
appearance, when arguably, with effective enforcement, a 
simple prescription that directors and auditors ‘act honestly’ 
would suffice.”203 
Such calls to roll back or at least revisit rules 
promoting directorial independence – hardly “heavy 
handed” in Australia anyway – were not widespread and 
soon ran up against renewed concerns about corporate 
ethics and practices in the wake of the GFC. Australia 
emerged relatively unscathed from that crisis, but it still had 
quite a patchy record in enforcing – even through ASIC – 
directors’ duties. The main regulatory response has instead 
been to require more independence and disclosures 
                                                
	  
	  
201 CLARKE ET AL., supra note 81, at 44. See also FRANK L. CLARKE ET AL., 
THE UNACCOUNTABLE AND UNGOVERNABLE CORPORATION: COMPANIES’ 
USE-BY-DATE CLOSES IN 65 (2014). 
202 CLARKE ET AL., supra note 81, at 48-9. 
203 Id. at 50, 60-63. However, this prescription is not as simple as it first 
appears, see, e.g., Julian Blanchard, Honesty in Corporations, 14 COMPANY 
& SEC. L. J. (1996). Australian corporate law experimented with this 
formulation in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) SS 232 (Austl.) but has 
since reverted to the “good faith” requirement, Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) SS 181 (Austl.), 
https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A00818. 
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associated with remuneration committees (from 2011, 
especially for ASX 300 companies) and in general for listed 
companies (under the 2014 ASX Principles, albeit still on an 
“if not, why not” basis). This is unlikely to surprise Clarke 
and Dean, who cynically suggested that: “Revamping and 
rebadging existing arrangements is a common political ploy 
by professional bodies, governments and their agencies 
when in crisis. It gives the appearance of there being a 
positive response to the public discomfort.”204  
More recently, two legal academics based in Australia 
have also questioned the concept and practicalities of 
director independence, drawing instead on ethics, 
philosophy, political science, and psychology to urge a 
broader or “thicker” version of independence. Le Mire and 
Gilligan begin by linking this to the philosophical concept of 
autonomy, and more specifically to “freedom from external 
influence” and especially “capacity for self-rule” (involving 
both competence and rational decision-making), with 
independence being “both an aspect of character and . . . 
outward-regarding in that it shapes the way an individual 
relates to the wider community.”205 Echoing Clarke and 
Dean, they go on to criticize the “thin” version of director 
independence evident in the ASX Principles, focused on 
“structural barriers” to block various relationships that 
might negative independence, but by emphasizing various 
psychological influences that anyway tend to erode 
independence (such as “group think” and socialization). Le 
Mire and Gilligan advocate elaborating and enhancing 
positive features of independence as well, such as: 
 
                                                
	  
	  
204 CLARKE ET AL., supra note 81, at 62. 
205 Le Mire & Gilligan, supra note 24, at 450. 
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•   ‘capacity’ (e.g. training, expertise, and continuing 
professional development); 
•   ‘status’ (e.g. identification internally and externally as 
independent); and 
•   ‘power’ (e.g. comprising a majority, meeting 
separately from other directors, and setting the 
agenda).206  
 
From this perspective, they favor the more holistic 
U.K. Corporate Governance Code (as revised in 2010, after 
the 2009 Walker Review) over the (then, Second Edition) 
ASX Principles, since the former arguably mandates board 
satisfaction regarding the capacity and expertise of 
directorial independence.207  
The explicit inclusion of “close family ties” and length 
of tenure (albeit unspecified) as factors potentially 
                                                
	  
	  
206 Id. at 459 (Figure 1). See also Wheeler, supra note 24, at 182-86 (focusing 
more closely on psychological research into decision-making, noting that 
avoiding “group think” is not so straightforward). To illustrate, a recent 
modification of that theory is that “an essential element is not group 
cohesion but perceived collective efficiency based on the group’s prior 
success. Translated into the language of boards this looks like an 
argument for liming the length of service of [NEDs] . . . rather than an 
argument for using independent to cut through social ties.” Id. at 185. 
Wheeler also points out that it is instead in socially cohesive groups, 
“exactly the sort of boardroom appointments that independence plus is 
considered to prevent, are more likely to see individuals voice dissent 
and the group then deal with that.” Id. at 184. 
207 Le Mire and Gilligan then analyze how various soft-law instruments 
(ASX Principles, U.K. Corporate Governance Code) and regulatory 
requirements (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, NYSE Listed Company Manual) 
promoting independence deal with a cascading series of relations that 
can compromise independence. Le Mire & Gilligan, supra note 24, at 458-
74 (especially Table 1 and 2). 
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compromising independence in the Third Edition ASX 
Principles (2014) arguably moves in the direction of the U.K. 
Code (see Part IV above). Despite some rewording, 
especially in the Commentary, the Principles retain a 
comparatively “thin” or structural vision of independence. 
More recently, Hanrahan and Bednall have picked up 
such critiques, as well as the particular objection from Swan 
about possibly undermining “skin in the game,” and 
therefore overall corporate performance. They argue that the 
independence requirement should be relaxed – but not 
completely abandoned – with respect to certain 
shareholdings. They find that about a quarter of ASX 200 
firms have a total of 112 directors who are, or are affiliated 
with, substantial (5+%) shareholders (of whom 109 are 
declared to non-independent, following the ASX Principles 
approach), but that 72 (70 declared non-independent) are not 
associated with what they term “controlling” shareholders. 
They suggest that the latter cohort should no longer be 
defined as (prima facie) lacking independence, because those 
directors are already sufficiently constrained with respect to 
possible conflicts of interest by various other corporate law 
rules. Furthermore, Hanrahan and Bednall state that the 
present approach “has a chilling effect on the participation at 
board level of individuals who have a powerful incentive to 
act as an effective counterbalance to both management and, 
where relevant, controlling shareholders.”208 However, it 
                                                
	  
	  
208 Hanrahan & Bednall, supra note 25, at 5. As constraints on partisan 
(in)action by directors, they include rules on director appointment and 
dismissal; limits on them participating in certain board discussions and 
decisions; constraints on directors’ conduct; and Australian courts’ broad 
powers to intervene for oppression. For earlier but very general 
justifications of independent directors in order to regulate serious 
conflicts of interest, rather than necessarily to improve overall corporate 
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remains to be seen if and when their proposal may be picked 
up by the ASX Corporate Governance Council, which has 
only just released a new edition of its Principles, or perhaps 
by adventurous, individually listed companies who may 
seek to redefine some directors (affiliated) with smaller 
shareholdings as nonetheless independent. 
A more holistic conception of director independence 
may gradually emerge as a by-product of the ASX’s recently 
introduced “diversity disclosure” policies. But, as discussed 
in Part III above, those changes, and the associated highly 
politicized debates, make surprisingly few direct references 
to the question of directors’ independence. This disjuncture 
may be because policy makers may now see Australia’s IDs 
framework as self-evidently useful – “mission 
accomplished” – despite occasional academic critiques, such 
as those mentioned above, and also because it is now 
underpinned by a sizable cohort of well-connected 
“professional directors” (Part II). More cynically, switching 
the reform focus to board “diversity” (though, in effect, 
currently limited to gender diversity) creates the façade of 
remedying inadequate corporate governance practices, but 
without addressing the much more politically difficult 
questions, such as whether existing corporate accounting 
standards and practices need a radical overhaul.209 
This is unfortunate because the IDs question itself is 
far from settled. Conceptually, it is related to the tension as 
to whether IDs – and indeed the board as a whole – should 
focus more narrowly on corporate performance or instead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
performance, see also Bosch, supra note 74; Stapledon & Lawrence, supra 
note 45.  
209 Cf. generally CLARKE ET AL., supra note 84; CLARKE ET AL., supra note 74. 
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on broader matters such as risk management.210 The tension 
was first highlighted in the early 1990s in Australia (Part II 
above), but it is also relevant to the diversity question. 
Moreover, Wheeler, writing on initiatives enhancing 
boardroom diversity in Australia and the U.K., and board 
independence (“independence plus”), suggests that a 
“structural solution has been applied to a perceived 
behavioral problem.”211 
Secondly and more concretely, increasing women 
representation on boards may well have unexpected effects 
due to the high preponderance of IDs already in Australia. 
For example, women currently in full-time middle or senior 
management, who are already under-represented, may be 
lured to (part-time, but lucrative) multiple ID appointments. 
While that might enhance corporate performance (or at least 
have other benefits for the other firm(s)) there may be more 
far-reaching negative effects for the original firm. More 
worryingly, Australia may (at least in the short term) end up 
with more “trophy women” on boards, as in the U.S.212 Such 
trends might exacerbate broader potential problems for 
board independence, such as an unnatural amplification of 
the “professional directors” phenomenon, increased board 
interlocks, and IDs’ board tenure.213 
Thirdly, broader empirical, theoretical, and 
comparative research into issues such as multiple and 
                                                
	  
	  
210 See generally Dunbar, supra note 24. 
211 Wheeler, supra note 24, at 182. 
212 Branson, supra note 122, at 8-9 (as noted, especially in the U.S.). 
213 For large firms in 2001, for example, one researcher found that firm 
valuation in high-growth firms was significantly negative for IDs with 
tenure of more than one year, and for IDs with at most two other board 
positions. Zoltan Matolcsy, Donald Stokes, & Anna Wright, Do 
Independent Directors Add Value?, 14 AUSTL. ACCT. REV. 33, 37-38 (2004) 
674 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
interlocking directorships in Australia is needed.214 Direct 
interlocks may be less frequent than in the past, but cross-
directorships no longer draw specific treatment in the 2014 
ASX Principles. Interlocks were still significant in the mid-
1990s,215 as well as from 2000-2007.216 Further, there is also a 
real possibility of, say, director X serving on board of 
company A, director Y serving on company B, with both X 
and Y also serving on the board of company C. Although 
each of X and Y may well qualify as independent under the 
ASX Principles, if they get to know each well at company C, 
this scenario raises corporate governance implications.217 
Also, even if X and Y do not serve together in other 
companies like C, what if they have or develop close 
personal or social connections, even via or supplemented by 
membership of AICD or other bodies that (somewhat 
ironically) now provide training for IDs? Put briefly, 
directors may satisfy a company’s independence 
requirements, but through social connections, they may not 
be independent of each other. As observed by the late Dr. 
Simon Marais (of the investment firm, Allan Gray), directors 
are “often friends, they may have worked together before 
and they’re very often known to the CEO before they join 
                                                
	  
	  
214 For similar appeals in the United States, see, e.g., Michal Barzuza & 
Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Corporate Governance, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
669 (2014). 
215 Kiel & Nicholson, supra note 45, at 192 (finding an average of around 
six interlocks per firm in 1996, compared to earlier studies finding 
around four in 1991 and six in 1986 and the late 1970s). 
216 See also Etheridge, supra note 40 (finding that board sizes and 
(differently specified) interlocks spiked around 2003, with board 
networks becoming less connected in recent years). 
217 Cf. Moncrieff, supra note 52 (focusing more on the potential negative 
impact on product market competition (e.g., where companies A and B 
are oligopolistic “rivals”)). 
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the board. All of this is wrong.”218 Such social connections 
are known to be particularly pervasive in smaller 
(population) economies,219 as well as some Asian 
economies,220 and therefore may further undermine any 
beneficial effects from having nominally independent 
directors. 
Indeed, some early econometric research in Australia 
found worse corporate performance from greater board 
independence (on a composite measure), but predominantly 
where those boards also exhibited high levels of “network 
connections.” The latter (composite) measure included both 
internal connections (the number of links each director had 
with other directors on the board, and the highest number of 
links held by an individual director) and external connections 
(the director’s numbers of links with external organizations, 
and the number of directors from other organizations linked 
with each member of the focal company’s board).221 An 
explanation for the observed result may be that directors 
with high levels of independence from management and 
many connections with other directors and/or outsiders are 
                                                
	  
	  
218 Domini Stuart, The Importance of Independence, COMPANY DIRECTOR 
MAGAZINE (Mar. 1, 2014), www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-
Resource-Centre/Publications/Company-Director-magazine/2014-back-
editions/March/Feature-The-importance-of-independence. 
219 Again, we thank Professor Ron Masulis for this general observation.  
220 For example, in India, 67% of all listed companies with a market 
capitalization above $50 million USD are family businesses. See CREDIT 
SUISSE, ASIAN FAMILY BUSINESS REPORT 2011 10 (2011), 
https://publications.credit-
suisse.com/tasks/render/file/index.cfm?fileid=88E4D28A-83E8-EB92-
9D56EA529104BFC2. 
221 Melinda M. Muth & Lex Donaldson, Stewardship Theory and Board 
Structure: A Contingency Approach, 6 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV. 5, 
13, 19, 25 (1998). 
676 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
either too “busy” to concentrate on monitoring and 
corporate performance,222 or deliberately make more poor 
choices to benefit blockholders, non-shareholder 
stakeholders, or other outsiders.  
Still, this represents only one empirical study. A 
recent analysis of all U.S. directors instead finds that higher 
firm valuations are associated with “powerful” IDs, defined 
in terms of their broader “social power” or network 
connections.223 An intriguing question is whether such a 
result is peculiar to countries with more dispersed 
shareholdings and/or activist institutional investors (as in 
the U.S.), as opposed to those with more non-institutional 
blockholders (as is still probably the case in Australia).224 
Another Pandora’s box in Australia is the extent to 
which listed companies (even the ASX 300) are routinely 
                                                
	  
	  
222 Cf. Ronald Masulis & Shawn Mobbs, What Can We Learn from 
Independent Directors with Multiple Board Seats about Board Monitoring and 
Corporate Actions?, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, 
WORKING PAPER NO. 353 (2013) (finding that even “busy” directors need 
not be associated with poor oversight and firm outcomes; the latter are 
instead characteristic of the subset who view the firm as relatively less 
important for their reputation). See generally Adrian C. H. Lei & Jie Deng, 
Do Multiple Directorships Increase Firm Value? Evidence from Independent 
Directors in Hong Kong, 25 J. INT’L. FIN. MGMT. & ACCT. 121 (2014) (for a 
look at the subject in Hong Kong). 
223 Fogel et al., supra note 195. Other insights from social psychology also 
suggest how social cohesion can generally improve decision-making in 
group situations. See Wheeler, supra note 24, at 182-84. 
224 See Satheesh Kumar T. Narayanan, Is the Institution of Independent 
Directors Irrelevant?: A Critical Inquiry into Why the Institution Has Failed to 
Lead to Better Corporate Governance, (Dec. 10, 2012) (unpublished paper), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2190351 (arguing 
from an Indian perspective, where shareholdings also tend to be more 
concentrated, that directors should only be able to have very few ID 
positions). 
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exempted from minimum requirements for IDs (on audit 
and now remuneration committees). In other words, the 
frequency of, and the reasons for, the ASX’s “waivers” to its 
own Listing Rules remain unclear. One commentator 
contends that such waivers are rather pervasive,225 but this 
question also deserves closer empirical treatment. 
In conclusion, the foregoing analysis demonstrates 
that the real aims and achievements of Australian ID 
requirements remain surprisingly under-explored. A closer 
analysis is warranted not just because this corporate 
governance issue is of continuing significance for one of the 
Asia-Pacific region’s most active stock markets – whether in 
terms of minimizing future large-scale corporate failures or 
more controversially enhancing corporate profitability. A 
closer analysis is also further warranted, as pursued in this 
article, because more sustained attention is required to 
challenge the perceived wisdom concerning IDs due to the 
important implications for various Asian-Pacific economies 
that have been strengthening minimum ID requirements. 
Australia’s experience is particularly interesting for those 
countries experiencing a shift towards more concentrated 
stockholdings (like the U.S.) because it problematizes 
whether and how to mandate or encourage directorial 
independence from substantial stockholders.  
 
                                                
	  
	  
225 Elisabeth Sexton, ASX Merger Plan Raises Questions of Governance, THE 
AGE (Oct. 29, 2010), www.theage.com.au/business/asx-merger-plan-
raises-questions-of-governance-20101028-175s7.html (quoting Professor 
Jennifer Hill). 
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APPENDIX: THE CAUTIONARY TALE OF HIH - ‘INDEPENDENT’ 
DIRECTORS AS LEMONS 
	  
Much has been said226 and much ink has been 
spilled227 over the failure of HIH Insurance Ltd. (‘HIH’) in 
2001, arguably Australia’s worst corporate collapse.228 
Billions of dollars of wealth were destroyed, some of HIH’s 
directors and senior management team were thrown into 
                                                
	  
	  
226 See, e.g., David Knott, Chairman of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, Address to the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors, Adelaide (May 23, 2001). 
227 See, e.g., Roman Tomasic, Corporate Collapse, Crime and Governance, 14 
AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 183 (2002); Michael De Martinis, Do Directors, 
Regulators, and Auditors Speak, Hear, and See No Evil? Evidence from the 
Enron, HIH, and One.Tel Collapses, 15 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 1 (2002); Farid 
Varess, The Buck Will Stop at the Board? An Examination of Directors’ (and 
Other) Duties in Light of the HIH collapse, 16 C.L.Q. 12 (2002); 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE 
FAILURE OF HIH INSURANCE, FINAL REPORT, vol. 1-3 (Apr. 18, 2003) 
[hereinafter HIH Royal Commission], 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/23212/20030418-
0000/www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/finalreport/index.htm; Jean du Plessis, 
Reverberations After the HIH and Other Recent Corporate Collapses: The Role 
of ASIC, 15 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 225 (2003); MARK WESTFIELD, HIH: THE 
INSIDE STORY OF AUSTRALIA’S BIGGEST CORPORATE COLLAPSE (2003); JOHN 
DOUGLAS MALTAS, THE DEMISE OF HIH: WHAT PART DID FAILED 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES PLAY? (2005); Gregor Allan, The HIH 
Collapse: A Costly Catalyst for Reform, 11 DEAKIN L. REV. 137 (2006); 
Roman Tomasic, The Challenge of Corporate Law Enforcement: Future 
Directions for Corporations Law in Australia, 10 U. W. SYDNEY L. REV. 1 
(2006).  
228 There are various measures by which to determine the magnitude of 
the collapse, see, e.g., du Plessis, supra note 2; cf. Paul von Nessen, 
Corporate Governance in Australia: Converging with International 
Developments, 15 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 1, 9 (2003). On any reckoning, the 
collapse was huge. 
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jail,229 and there were enormous social and economic 
impacts on various stakeholders (especially employees) and 
HIH insurance policy holders. Justice Neville Owen’s three-
volume Royal Commission Report catalogued a cascade of 
disastrous operational decisions, fraught business 
expansion, chronic under-provisioning, ineffective auditing, 
and limp regulatory oversight. These problems were all 
caused, and compounded by, poor corporate governance 
structures.230 In this connection, the “shambling journey 
towards oblivion,” wrote Justice Owen, had deep roots.231 
Many used HIH’s demise as a clarion call to improve 
auditor independence, extend corporate liability to senior 
managers, and, of course, improve corporate governance. 
However, this brief case study merely draws attention to the 
endemic dysfunctionality of HIH’s board and, in particular, 
the inefficacy of its pusillanimous non-executive directors. 
Put bluntly, when viewed through the lens of effective 
corporate governance, the (notionally) majority 
“independent” board of then Australia’s second largest 
insurer (but leading general insurance company) showed 
itself to be a “lemon.” 
Yet it is illusory to say that the majority of the board 
was independent (in the sense used in this article). Closer 
                                                
	  
	  
229 Two directors, Rodney Adler and Ray Williams, each received 
maximum custodial sentences of four and a half years. Of the nine 
prosecutions ASIC pursued, eight resulted in custodial sentences. See 
Media Release, Former HIH Chief Financial Officer Sentenced on ASIC 
Charges, ASX (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.asic.gov.au/about-
asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2007-releases/07-289-former-
hih-chief-financial-officer-sentenced-on-asic-charges/. 
230 For a useful synopsis, see HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 
1, xvi-xx. 
231 Id. at vol. 1, xiii. 
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examination exposes the truth. A snapshot of HIH’s board at 
June 30, 1999, reveals a board of thirteen directors, five of 
whom were executive directors.232 Of the eight non-
executive directors,233 the bulk were compromised: four 
inside directors (Charles Abbott,234 Rodney Adler,235 
Geoffrey Cohen236 and Robert Stitt237) and two could be 
                                                
	  
	  
232 Raymond Williams, Dominic Fodera, Terence Cassidy, George 
Sturesteps, and Randolph Wein. See HIH Royal Commission, supra note 
2, at vol. 3, pg. 262, para. 23.2.2.  
233 Geoffrey Cohen, Charles Abbott, Rodney Adler, Justin Gardener, 
Alexander Gorrie, Neville Head, Michael Payne, and Robert Stitt; HIH 
Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 3, pg. 262, para. 23.2.2. 
234 Charles Abbott served as a legal consultant to HIH and the law firm 
Blake Dawson Waldron (BDW) where he was formerly a partner. In 
1996, after learning that BDW was not on HIH’s legal panel, he lobbied 
for this to change. Abbott’s consultancy agreement with BDW involved 
payment of a $25,000 annual fee (indexed) and 10% of fees rendered by 
BDW on work he introduced. Abbott was also associated with HIH’s 
major shareholder between 1995 and 1998; see HIH Royal Commission, 
supra note 2, at vol. 1, pg. 114-15, para. 6.2.7; vol. 3, pg. 262, para. 23.2.2; 
pg. 298-300, para. 23.6.3.  
235 Following HIH’s acquisition of FAI Insurance, Rodney Adler (FAI’s 
then CEO and major shareholder) joined HIH’s board in April 1999, 
where he remained until its collapse. At that time, he was also engaged 
as a consultant by HIH. The consultancy agreement (the terms of which 
were never documented) was lucrative. Adler secured a payment of 
$40,000 per month for his services, which Justice Owen described as 
being no more than Adler ought to have done as a non-executive 
director. See HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 1, para. 3.3; vol. 
3, para. 23.6.2. 
236Geoffrey Cohen, chairman of HIH (and its predecessor, CE Health 
since January 1992) was a former partner of Arthur Anderson (CE 
Health’s, and then HIH’s auditor since 1973). While serving as HIH’s 
chairman and non-executive director for over ten years, Cohen enjoyed 
an (undisclosed) lucrative consultancy agreement and retirement 
benefits from Anderson; see HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 
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charitably characterized as outside directors (Justin 
Gardener238 and Michael Payne).239 Thus, there were only 
two independent non-executive directors: Alexander 
Gorrie240 and Neville Head.241 Justice Owen thought that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
1, pg. 51-54, para. 3.1-3.2.2; vol. 3, pg. 86-87, para. 21.4.3 (detailing these 
and other benefits from Anderson); pg. 262, para. 23.2.2. 
237  Robert Stitt QC was appointed as a non-executive director to CE 
Health in January, 1992, and sat on the board for about ten years. Prior to 
his appointment to the board, he had provided legal advice to the [HIH] 
group over a “lengthy period”; HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at 
vol. 1, pg. 51, para. 3.1; vol. 3, pg. 262, para. 23.2.2. From 1998 to 2001, 
Stitt was also a director of HIHC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of HIH, but 
never attended any directors meeting because he most probably “forgot” 
he was on its board. Id. at vol. 3, pg. 324-25, para. 23.9.5. 
238  From December 2, 1998, Justin Gardener became the third former 
Anderson partner to join HIH’s board. He was a member, and later chair 
of the HIH’s audit committee. Prior to “immediately” joining HIH after 
leaving Anderson, Gardener was HIH’s audit partner from 1973 to 1989, 
whereby cultivated a business relationship with Ray Williams, whom 
considered Gardener a “true business advisor.” See HIH Royal 
Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 3, pg. 86-88, para. 21.4.3; pg. 262, para. 
23.2.2. 
239 Michael Payne had a long association with HIH. In fact, he was co-
founder of HIH’s predecessor in 1968. Although he was non-executive 
director by June 1999, he had previously sat on the HIH’s board as an 
executive director, and was CEO of HIH (U.K.). See HIH Royal 
Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 1, pg. 51-58, para. 3.1-3.4.2; vol. 3, pg. 
262, para. 23.2.2. 
240  But Alexander Gorrie was previously a director of CIC Insurance, 
which HIH’s predecessor, CE Heath, acquired in June 1995. He was 
appointed as an alternate director to HIH in August 1995, and then as a 
non-executive director in 1997; see HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, 
at vol. 1, pg. 54, para. 3.2.2. 
241 Neville Head was appointed to the board of HIH’s predecessor, CE 
Heath, as a non-executive director in January 1992. He resigned in 
August 1999. HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at, vol. 1, xxxvii; pg. 
51, at para. 3.1.  
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these directors had met Derek Higgs’ criteria of 
“independence,”242 before noting that they had both 
resigned by the end of 1999.243 
Although HIH was then without independent 
directors until its collapse in 2001, Gorrie and Head’s efforts 
to improve corporate governance structures proved to be in 
vain. As we will see, that HIH’s corporate culture “was 
inimical to sound management practices” is undeniable. As 
the Royal Commission’s Report further explained: 
 
The problematic aspects of the corporate 
culture of HIH – which led directly to the poor 
decision-making – can be summarised 
succinctly. There was blind faith in a 
leadership that was ill-equipped for the task. 
There was insufficient ability and 
independence of mind in and associated with 
the organisation to see what had to be done 
and what had to be stopped or avoided. Risks 
were not properly identified and managed. 
Unpleasant information was hidden, filtered 
or sanitised. And there was a lack of sceptical 
questioning and analysis when and where it 
mattered.244 
 
                                                
	  
	  
242 See Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive 
Directors (Jan. 2003), at 37. 
243 See HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 3, pg. 262, para. 
23.2.2. 
244 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at pg. 216, vol. 1, xvii. For a 
useful synopsis of corporate governance failures here, see id. at xxxiii-
xliii. 
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This short quote not only encapsulates the serious 
flaws in management practices, but also highlights the 
anemic contribution by the non-executive directors to HIH’s 
governance. These interconnected problems deserve further 
unpacking, for they reveal three major lessons that may be 
drawn from HIH’s failure.  
Firstly, the dangers of a dictatorial CEO, coupled with 
a weak board, are apparent here. Ray Williams, described as 
a “dominant personality” and unrivalled in terms of 
“authority and influence,”245 treated the company he co-
founded as his personal fiefdom.246 He did not tolerate 
dissent. Moreover, even though Williams spearheaded a 
series of disastrous business decisions, some of which even 
lacked fundamental due diligence, he remained 
“unchallenged.”247 
A second and related problem was the ineffective 
monitoring by the board. Executive directors and senior 
management were not kept in check. To the contrary, the 
board appeared captured by senior management. The 
evidence strongly suggested that there was never an instance 
where the board “rejected or materially changed” 
                                                
	  
	  
245 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 1, xxvii.  
246 For instance, there was no nomination committee, and all candidate’s 
chosen by Williams were ratified. See HIH Royal Commission, supra note 
2, at vol. 3, pg. 264, para. 23.2.4.  
247 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 1. For example, in 
relation to Williams’ proposal to launch a takeover of FAI at 75c per 
share, there was “no discussion about the price” and “none of the other 
directors dared question him.” Westfield, supra note 2, at 110. Justice 
Owen identifies the FAI acquisition as “yet another example of 
management pursuing an objective without regard to the role of the 
board.” HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, vol. 3, pg. 274-76, para. 
23.3.3.  
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management proposals.248 This was no doubt due to the 
board’s reluctance to oppose such proposals, given that 
Williams sponsored them all.249 With the benefit of 
hindsight, Gorrie conceded that managerial pressure over 
board deliberations compromised its independence.250 
It is true there were instances where non-executive 
directors raised governance concerns.251 But those efforts 
were too little, too late. In two separate letters in May of 
1999, Gardener (to Williams) and Head (to Cohen) aired 
concerns about managerial control over board agenda and 
HIH’s corporate governance procedures (especially the 
adequacy of discussion over “critical issues” and the quality 
of board papers) respectively.252 Neither Gardener’s nor 
Head’s concerns, or suggested improvements, were taken 
seriously. They were not circulated at a formal board 
meeting, but rather were briefly canvassed at a specially 
convened meeting of non-executive directors called by 
Williams. The other non-executive directors (Head was 
abroad) predictably fell into line.253 Much responsibility for 
these corporate governance failures was sheeted home to 
                                                
	  
	  
248 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 3, pg. 262, para. 23.2.2.  
249 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 3, pg. 262-63, para. 23.2.2. 
250 But cf. HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 3, pg. 262-63, para. 
23.2.2 (noting the evidence given by the other independent director, 
Head, whom despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, denied 
that board independence was compromised by managerial influence). 
251 See generally HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 1, xxxvii; 
vol. 3, pg. 267-71, para. 23.2.6. 
252 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 3, pg. 267-8, para. 23.2.6. 
253 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 1, xxxvii; vol. 3, pg. 268, 
para. 23.2.6. 
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Geoffrey Cohen, said to be an “ineffective chairman.”254 In 
particular, Justice Owen found that Cohen’s responsibility 
here was to ensure the board properly considered 
Gardener’s memo,255 as well as to act on Head’s “astute and 
well-reasoned”256 concerns.  
The third lesson to be drawn from HIH’s failure 
relates to its poor business ethics257 and its conflicts of 
interest management system. In short, there was no such 
system. Once more, the unfortunate star here is the 
chairman. (Cohen appears to have adopted a cavalier 
attitude to conflict of interest management. For instance, 
somewhat inexplicably, he denied a conflict of interest arose 
via his position as chairman of HIH audit committee and his 
personal consultancy agreement with Andersen.)258 Cohen 
was also singled out as having a special responsibility to 
ensure the identification, consideration, and resolution of 
possible conflicts of interest.259 Justice Owen found that 
Cohen’s “abdication” of responsibility in this respect proved 
to be a “grave impediment to the proper functioning of the 
board.”260 However, the Royal Commission was also careful 
                                                
	  
	  
254 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 1, xxxvii. Cohen failed to 
hold the CEO Williams to account and he inexcusably relinquished 
control of the board agenda to management: xxxvii-xxxix. 
255 See HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 1, xxxviii; vol. 3, pg. 
269, para. 23.2.6.  
256 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at, vol. 1, xxxviii. 
257 See supra notes 10-15. Justice Owen suggested that some board 
members may have “grasped the theory” of conflict of interest, but the 
practical applications, suggested otherwise: HIH Royal Commission, 
supra note 2, at vol. 1, xxxvi. 
258 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 3, pg. 262, para. 23.2.2. 
259 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 1, pg. 114, para. 6.2.7; vol. 
3, pg. 271–272, para. 23.2.6. 
260 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 3, pg. 272, para. 23.2.6. 
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to point out that the chairman was not solely to blame: “the 
board should have also ensured that proper procedures 
were in place.”261 The independent directors, in particular, 
shirked their responsibilities here.  
While there was a “semblance of standard corporate 
governance mechanisms at work,”262 HIH’s failure is a stark 
reminder of the likely outcome that the coupling of poor 
corporate governance structures with disastrous 
(mis)management can have. Even though HIH was 
fundamentally flawed on so many levels, the independent 
directors still ought to have done more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
                                                
	  
	  
261 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 3, pg. 271, para. 23.2.6; 
vol. 1, pg. 114–115, para 6.27. See also id. at vol. 1, (stating that xxxvii: 
“The board should have recognised [this] as a problem an moved on its 
own initiative to install a proper system”). 
262 HIH Royal Commission, supra note 2, at vol. 1, pg. 101. 
